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ON BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN POTENTIAL GAMES
BRIAN SWENSON†, RYAN MURRAY‡, AND SOUMMYA KAR†
Abstract. The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics
from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly
understood in many games of interest due to the discontinuous, set-valued nature of the best-response
map. The paper focuses on elucidating several important properties of best-response dynamics in the
class of multi-agent games known as potential games—a class of games with fundamental importance
in multi-agent systems and distributed control. It is shown that in almost every potential game and
for almost every initial condition, the best-response dynamics (i) have a unique solution, (ii) converge
to pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and (iii) converge at an exponential rate.
Key words. Game theory, Learning, Best-response dynamics, Fictitious play, Potential games,
Convergence rate
AMS subject classifications. 93A14, 93A15, 91A06, 91A26, 37B25
1. Introduction. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a solution concept for multi-player
games in which no player can unilaterally improve their personal utility. Formally, a
Nash equilibrium is defined as a fixed point of the best-response mapping—that is, a
strategy x∗ is said to be a NE if
x∗ ∈ BR(x∗),
where BR denotes the (set-valued) best-response mapping (see Section 2 for a formal
definition).
A question of fundamental interest is, given the opportunity to interact, how
might a group of players adaptively learn to play a NE strategy over time? In response,
it is natural to consider the dynamical system induced by the best response mapping
itself:1
(1) x˙ ∈ BR(x)− x.
By definition, the set of NE coincide with the equilibrium points of these dynamics.
In the literature, the learning procedure (1) is generally referred to as best-response
dynamics (BR dynamics) [11,16,19,21,23,34].2
BR dynamics are fundamental to game theory and have been studied in numer-
ous works including [3, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28, 34]. These dynamics model various
forms of learning in games. From the perspective of evolutionary learning, (1) can
be seen as modeling adaptation in a large population when some small fraction of
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We note that a preliminary version of the work on the rate of convergence of BR dynamics in Section
6 was presented at the Allerton conference on communication, control, and computing [45].
1Since the map BR is set-valued (see Section 2.1), the dynamical system (1) is a differential
inclusion rather than a differential equation. However, as we will see later in the paper, in potential
games the BR map can generally be shown to be almost-everywhere single-valued along solution
curves of (1) (see Remark 29). Thus, for the intents and purposes of this paper, it is relatively safe
to think of (1) as a differential equation x˙ = BR(x)− x with discontinuous right-hand side.
2For reasons soon to become clear, the system (1) is sometimes also referred to as (continuous-
time) fictitious play [17, 25,42]. We will favor the term “BR dynamics”.
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2 B. SWENSON, R. MURRAY, AND S. KAR
the population revises their strategy as a best response to the current population
strategy [21]. Another interpretation is to consider games with a finite number of
players and suppose that each player continuously adapts their strategy according to
the dynamics (1). From this perspective, the dynamics (1) are closely related to a
number of discrete-time learning processes. For example, the popular fictitious play
(FP) algorithm—a canonical algorithm that serves as a prototype for many others—
is merely an Euler discretization of (1).3 Accordingly, many asymptotic properties
of FP can be determined by studying the asymptotic properties of the system (1)
(this approach is formalized in [3]). As another example, [28] studies a payoff-based
algorithm in which players estimate expected payoffs and tend, with high probability,
to pick best response actions; the underlying dynamics can again be shown to be
governed by the differential inclusion (1). There are numerous other learning algo-
rithms [12,30,36,43,46,47] (to cite a few recent examples) that rely on best-response
adaptation whose underlying dynamics are heavily influenced by (1). Using the frame-
work of stochastic approximation [3, 4, 26, 48], the relationship between such discrete
and continuous dynamics can be made rigorous.
The BR dynamics are also closely related to other popular learning dynamics
including the replicator dynamics [22] and positive definite adaptive dynamics [23].
While these dynamics do not rely explicitly on best-response adaptation, their asymp-
totic behavior is often similar to that of BR dynamics [22,23].
Despite the general importance of BR dynamics in game theory, they are not well
understood in many games of interest. In large part, this is due to the fact that,
since (1) is a differential inclusion rather than a classical differential equation, it is
often difficult to analyze using classical techniques. In this work our objective will
be to elucidate several fundamental properties of (1) within the important class of
multi-agent games known as potential games [37].4
In a potential game, there exists an underlying potential function which all players
implicitly seek to maximize. Such games are fundamentally cooperative in nature
(all players benefit by maximizing the potential) and have a tremendous number of
applications in both economics [37, 40] and engineering [6, 9, 29, 31, 39, 41, 44], where
game-theoretic learning dynamics such as (1) are commonly used as mechanisms for
distributed control of multi-agent systems. Along with so-called harmonic games
(which are fundamentally adversarial in nature), potential games may be seen as one
of the basic building blocks of general N -player games [7].
In finite potential games there are several important properties of (1) that are
not well understood. For example
• It is not known if solutions of (1) are generically well posed. More pre-
cisely, being a differential inclusion, it is known that solutions of (1) may
lack uniqueness for some initial conditions. But it is not understood if non-
uniqueness of solutions is typical, or if it is somehow exceptional. E.g., it may
be the case that solutions are unique from almost every initial condition, and
hence (1) is, in fact, generically well posed in potential games. This has been
speculated [19], but has never been shown.
• There are no convergence rate estimates for BR dynamics in potential games.
It has been conjectured that the rate of convergence of (1) is exponential in
potential games ([17], Conjecture 25). However, this has never been shown.
3Hence the name “continuous-time fictitious play” for (1).
4We will focus here on potential games with a finite number of actions, saving continuous potential
games for a future work.
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Regarding the second point, we remark that, even outside the class of BR-based
learning dynamics, convergence rate estimates for game-theoretic learning dynamics
are relatively scarce. Thus, given the practical importance of convergence rates in
applications, there is strong motivation for establishing rigorous convergence rate
estimates for learning dynamics in general. This is particularly relevant in engineering
applications with large numbers of players.
Underlying both of the above issues is a single common problem. The set of NE
may be subdivided into pure-strategy (deterministic) NE and mixed-strategy (prob-
abilistic) NE. Mixed-strategy NE tend to be highly problematic for a number of
reasons [24]. Being a differential inclusion, trajectories of (1) can reach a mixed equi-
librium in finite time. In a potential game, once a mixed equilibrium has been reached,
a trajectory can rest there for an arbitrary length of time before moving elsewhere.
This is both the cause of non-uniqueness of solutions and the principal reason why it
is impossible to establish general convergence rate estimates which hold at all points.
In addition to hindering our theoretical understanding of BR dynamics, mixed
equilibria are also highly problematic from a more application-oriented perspective.
Mixed equilibria are nondeterministic, have suboptimal expected utility, and do not
always have clear physical meaning [2]; consequently, in engineering applications, prac-
titioners often prefer algorithms that are guaranteed to converge to a pure-strategy
NE [2,29,32,33].
It has been speculated that, in potential games (or at least, outside of zero-sum
games), BR dynamics should rarely converge to mixed equilibria [2, 19, 25], and thus
the aforementioned issues should rarely arise in practice. However, rigorous proof of
such a result has not been available.
In this paper we attempt to shed some light on these issues. Informally speak-
ing, we will show that in potential games (i) BR dynamics almost never converge to
mixed equilibria, (ii) solutions of (1) are almost always unique, and (iii) the rate of
convergence of (1) is almost always exponential.
The study of these issues is complicated by the fact that one can easily construct
counterexamples of potential games where BR dynamics behave poorly. In order to
eliminate such cases, we will focus on games that are “regular” as introduced by
Harsanyi [18]. Regular games (see Section 3) have been studied extensively in the
literature [50]; they are highly robust and simple to work with, and, as we will see
below, are ideally suited to studying BR dynamics.
The linchpin in addressing all of the issues noted above is gaining a rigorous
understanding of the question of convergence to mixed equilibria. The main result of
the paper is the following theorem, which shows that convergence to such equilibria is
in fact exceptional. Before stating the theorem we note that, unless explicitly specified
otherwise, throughout the paper we use the term “potential game” broadly to mean
a weighted potential game [38] (which includes exact potential games and games with
identical payoffs as special cases).
Theorem 1. Suppose Γ is a regular potential game. Then from almost every
initial condition, solutions of (1) converge to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In a companion paper [49] we show that “most” potential games are regular. In
particular, Theorem 1 of [49] shows that (i) almost every weighted potential game is
regular, (ii) almost every exact potential game is regular, and (iii) almost every game
with identical payoffs is regular.5 Thus, as an immediate consequence of Theorem 1
5When we say that a property holds for almost every game of a certain class, we mean that
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above and Theorem 1 of [49] we get the following result:
Theorem 2. In almost every weighted potential game, almost every exact poten-
tial game, and almost every game with identical payoffs, solutions of (1) converge to
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium from almost every initial condition.
Moreover, since pure equilibria are highly stable in regular potential games (they are
strict [50]), Theorem 1 also implies that BR dynamics generically converge to equi-
libria that are stable both to perturbations in strategies and payoffs. As a byproduct
of the proof of Theorem 1 we will get the following result regarding uniqueness of
solutions of (1):6
Proposition 3. Suppose Γ is a potential game. Then for almost every initial
condition, solutions of (1) are unique.
Finally, as a simple application of Theorem 1 we will prove the following result:
Theorem 4. Suppose Γ is a potential game. Then for almost every initial con-
dition, solutions of (1) converge to the set of NE at an exponential rate.
We remark that this resolves the Harris conjecture ([17], Conjecture 25) on the rate
of convergence of continuous-time fictitious play in weighted potential games.7,8
We also remark that the question of (non-) convergence of BR dynamics to mixed
equilibria was previously considered9 in [25] for the case of two-player games where it
was shown that BR dynamics “almost never converge cyclically to a mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which both players use more than two pure strategies.” In contrast,
in this paper we consider potential games of arbitrary size and prove (generic) non-
convergence to all mixed equilibria.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 1.1–1.2 we outline
our high-level strategy for proving Theorem 1 and compare with classical techniques.
Sections 2.1–2.2 set up notation. Section 2.3 gives a simple two-player example illus-
trating the fundamental problems arising in BR dynamics in potential games. Section
3 introduces regular potential games. Section 4 establishes the two key inequalities
used to prove Theorem 1. Section 5 gives the proof of Theorem 1. Section 5.2 proves
uniqueness of solutions (Proposition 3). Section 6 proves the exponential convergence
rate estimate (Theorem 4). Section 7 concludes the paper.
1.1. Proof Strategy. The basic strategy is to leverage two noteworthy proper-
ties satisfied in regular potential games:
1. The BR dynamics cannot cannot concentrate volume in finite time, meaning
the flow induced by (1) cannot map a set of positive (Lebesgue) measure to
the subset of games in that class where the property fails to hold has (appropriately dimensioned)
Lebesgue measure zero. See [49] for more details. Note that the class of games with identical payoffs
is a measure-zero subset within the class of exact potential games which, in turn, is a measure-zero
subset within the class of weighted potential games. Thus, generic regularity in a superclass does
not imply generic regularity in a subclass.
6The notion of solutions considered in the paper is defined in Section 2.2.
7Harris [17] showed that the rate of convergence of (1) is exponential in zero-sum games and
conjectured that the rate of convergence is exponential in (weighted) potential games. However, due
to the problems arising from mixed equilibria in potential games, [17] does not attempt to prove this
conjecture. Our main result allows us to handle the problems arising due to mixed equilibria, and
consequently allows for an easy proof of the exponential rate of convergence as conjectured in [17].
8A preliminary version of the convergence rate estimate in Theorem 4 (see also Proposition 31)
can be found in an earlier conference version of this work [45].
9More precisely, [25] considers a variant of (1), equivalent after a time change.
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a set of zero measure in finite time (see Section 5.1).
2. In a neighborhood of an interior Nash equilibrium (i.e., a completely mixed
equilibrium), the magnitude of the time derivative of the potential along paths
grows linearly in the distance to the Nash equilibrium, while the value of the
potential varies only quadratically; that is,
d
dt
U(x(t)) ≥ d(x(t), x∗) ≥
√
|U(x(t))− U(x∗)|,
where U denotes the potential function and x∗ is the equilibrium point.
Using Markov’s inequality, property 2 immediately implies that if a path converges
to an interior NE then it must do so in finite time (see Section 5.3). Hence, properties
1 and 2 together imply that the set of points from which BR dynamics converge to
an interior NE must have Lebesgue measure zero.
In order to handle mixed NE that are not in the interior of the strategy space (i.e.,
incompletely mixed equilibria), we consider a projection that maps incompletely mixed
equilibria to the interior of the strategy space of a lower dimensional game. Using the
techniques described above we are then able to handle completely and incompletely
mixed equilibria in a unified manner.
In particular, since the number of NE strategies is finite in regular potential
games, we see that the set of points from which BR dynamics converge to the set of
mixed-strategy NE has Lebesgue measure zero in any such game. Since any solution
of (1) must converge to a NE [3], this implies Theorem 1.
Properties 1 and 2 hold as long the equilibrium x∗ is regular. In a companion
paper [49] we show that, in almost all potential games, all equilibria are regular.
1.2. Comparison with Classical Techniques. Given a classical ODE, one
can prove that an equilibrium point may only be reached from a set of measure
zero by studying the linearized dynamics at the equilibrium point. Assuming all
eigenvalues associated with the linearized system are non-zero, the dimension of the
stable manifold (i.e., the set of initial conditions from which the equilibrium can be
reached) is equal to the dimension of the stable eigenspace of the linearized system [10].
Hence, to prove that an equilibrium can only be reached from a set of measure zero,
it is sufficient to prove that at least one eigenvalue of the linearized system lies in the
right half plane.
In BR dynamics, the vector field is discontinuous—hence, it is not possible to
linearize around an equilibrium point, and such classical techniques cannot be directly
applied. However, the gradient field of the potential function is closely linked to the
BR-dynamics vector field (i.e., the vector field BR(x) − x; see Lemma 13 for more
details). Unlike the BR-dynamics vector field, the gradient field of the potential
function can be linearized. In a non-degenerate game, any completely mixed-strategy
NE is a non-degenerate saddle point of the potential function. Hence, at least one
eigenvalue of the linearized gradient system must lie in the right-half plane. This
implies that, for the gradient dynamics of the potential function, the stable manifold
associated with an equilibrium point has dimension at most κ − 1, where κ is the
dimension of the strategy space.
Given the close relationship between the BR-dynamics vector field and the gra-
dient field of the potential function, intuition suggests that for BR dynamics, each
mixed equilibrium should also admit a similar low-dimensional stable manifold.
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While this provides an intuitive explanation for why one might expect Theorem
1 to hold, we did not use any such linearization arguments in the proof of this result.
We found that studying the rate of potential production near mixed equilibria (e.g.,
as discussed in the “proof strategy” section above) led to shorter and simpler proofs.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Notation. A game in normal form is represented by the tuple
Γ := (N, (Yi, ui)i=1,...,N ), where N ∈ {2, 3, . . .} denotes the number of players, Yi =
{y1i , . . . , yKii } denotes the set of pure strategies (or actions) available to player i, with
cardinality Ki := |Yi|, and ui :
∏N
j=1 Yj → R denotes the utility function of player i.
Denote by Y :=
∏N
i=1 Yi the set of joint pure strategies, and let K :=
∏N
i=1Ki denote
the number of joint pure strategies.
For a finite set S, let 4(S) denote the set of probability distributions over S.
For i = 1, . . . , N , let ∆i := 4(Yi) denote the set of mixed-strategies available to
player i. Let ∆ :=
∏N
i=1 ∆i denote the set of joint mixed strategies.
10 Let ∆−i :=∏
j∈{1,...,N}\{i}∆j . When convenient, given a mixed strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ ∆,
we use the notation σ−i to denote the tuple (σj)j 6=i
Given a mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆, the expected utility of player i is given by
Ui(σ1, . . . , σN ) =
∑
y∈Y
ui(y)σ1(y1) · · ·σN (yN ).
For σ−i ∈ ∆−i, the best response of player i is given by the set-valued function
BRi : ∆−i ⇒ ∆i,
BRi(σ−i) := arg max
σ′i∈∆i
Ui(σ
′
i, σ−i),
where we use the double right arrows to indicate a set-valued function. For σ ∈ ∆
the joint best response is given by the set-valued function BR : ∆⇒ ∆
BR(σ) := BR1(σ−1)× · · · × BRN (σ−N ).
A strategy σ ∈ ∆ is said to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) if σ ∈ BR(σ). For
convenience, we sometimes refer to a Nash equilibrium simply as an equilibrium.
We say that Γ is a potential game (or, more precisely, a finite weighted potential
game) [37] if there exists a function u : Y → R and a vector of positive weights (wi)Ni=1,
such that ui(y
′
i, y−i)− ui(y′′i , y−i) = wi
(
u(y′i, y−i)− u(y′′i , y−i)
)
for all y−i ∈ Y−i and
y′i, y
′′
i ∈ Yi, for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Let U : ∆→ R be the multilinear extension of u defined by
(2) U(σ1, . . . , σN ) =
∑
y∈Y
u(y)σ1(y1) · · ·σ(yN ).
The function U may be seen as giving the expected value of u under the mixed strategy
σ. We refer to U as the potential function and to u as the pure form of the potential
function.
Using the definitions of Ui and U it is straightforward to verify that
BRi(σ−i) := arg max
σi∈∆i
Ui(σi, σ−i) = arg max
σi∈∆i
U(σi, σ−i).
10It is implicitly assumed that players’ mixed strategies are independent; i.e., players do not
coordinate.
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Thus, in order to compute the best response set we only require knowledge of the
potential function U , not necessarily the individual utility functions (Ui)i=1,...,N .
By way of notation, given a pure strategy yi ∈ Yi and a mixed strategy σ−i ∈ ∆−i,
we will write U(yi, σ−i) to indicate the value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy
placing all weight on the yi and the remaining players use the strategy σ−i ∈ ∆−i.
Given a σi ∈ ∆i, let σki denote value of the k-th entry in σi, so that σi = (σki )Kik=1.
Since the potential function is linear in each σi, if we fix any i = 1, . . . , N we may
express it as
(3) U(σ) =
Ki∑
k=1
σki U(y
k
i , σ−i).
In order to study learning dynamics without being (directly) encumbered by the
hyperplane constraint inherent in ∆i we define
Xi := {xi ∈ RKi−1 : 0 ≤ xki ≤ 1 for k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1, and
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki ≤ 1},
where we use the convention that xki denotes the k-th entry in xi so that xi =
(xki )
Ki−1
k=1 .
Given xi ∈ Xi define the bijective mapping Ti : Xi → ∆i as Ti(xi) = σi for the
unique σi ∈ ∆i such that σki = xk−1i for k = 2, . . . ,Ki and σ1i = 1 −
∑Ki−1
k=1 x
k
i . For
k = 1, . . . ,Ki let T
k
i be the k-th component map of Ti so that Ti = (T
k
i )
Ki
i=1.
Let X := X1 × · · · × XN and let T : X → ∆ be the bijection given by T =
T1 × · · · × TN . In an abuse of terminology, we sometimes refer to X as the mixed-
strategy space of Γ. When convenient, given an x ∈ X we use the notation x−i to
denote the tuple (xj)j 6=i. Letting X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj , we define T−i : X−i → ∆−i as
T−i := (Tj)j 6=i. Let
(4) κ :=
N∑
i=1
(|Yi| − 1)
denote the dimension of X, and note that κ 6= K, where K, defined earlier, is the
cardinality of the joint pure strategy set Y .
Throughout the paper we often find it convenient to work in X rather than ∆.
In order to keep the notation as simple as possible we overload the definitions of some
symbols when the meaning can be clearly derived from the context. In particular,
let BRi : X−i ⇒ Xi be defined by BRi(x−i) := {xi ∈ Xi : BRi(σ−i) = σi, σi ∈
∆i, σ−i ∈ ∆−i, σi = Ti(xi), σ−i = T−i(x−i)}. Similarly, given an x ∈ X we abuse
notation and write U(x) instead of U(T (x)).
Given a pure strategy yi ∈ Yi, we will write U(yi, x−i) to indicate the value of U
when player i uses a mixed strategy placing all weight on the yi and the remaining
players use the strategy x−i ∈ X−i. Similarly, we will say yki ∈ BRi(x−i) if there
exists an xi ∈ BRi(x−i) such that Ti(xi) places weight one on yki .
Applying the definition of Ti to (3) we see that U(x) may also be expressed as
(5) U(x) =
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki U(y
k+1
i , x−i) +
(
1−
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki
)
U(y1i , x−i).
for any i = 1, . . . , N .
We use the following nomenclature to refer to strategies in X.
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Definition 5. (i) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be pure if T (x) places all its mass
on a single action tuple y ∈ Y .
(ii) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be completely mixed if x is in the interior of X.
(iii) In all other cases, a strategy x ∈ X is said to be incompletely mixed.
2.1.1. Other Notation. Other notation as used throughout the paper is as
follows.
• N := {1, 2, . . .}.
• ∇xiU(x) := ( ∂U∂xki (x))
Ki−1
k=1 gives the gradient of U with respect to the strategy
of player i only. ∇U(x) := ( ∂U
∂xki
(x)) i=1,...,N
k=1,...,Ki−1
gives the full gradient of U .
• Suppose m,n, p ∈ N, Fi : Rm × Rn → R, for i = 1, . . . , p. Suppose further
that F : Rm × Rn → Rp is given by F (w, z) = (Fi(w, z))i=1,...,p. Then
the operator Dw gives the Jacobian of F with respect to the components of
w = (wk)k=1,...,m; that is
DwF (w, z) =

∂F1(w,z)
∂w1
· · · ∂F1(w,z)∂wm
...
. . .
...
∂Fp(w,z)
∂w1
· · · ∂Fp(w,z)∂wm
 .
• Ac denotes the complement of a set A, and A˚ denotes the interior of A, and
clA denotes the closure of A.
• The support of a function f : Ω→ R is given by spt(f) := {x ∈ Ω : f(x) 6= 0}.
• Given a function f , D(f) refers to the domain of f and R(f) to the range of
f .
• Ln, n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} refers to the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure.
• Given an open set Ω ⊂ Rn, and k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, Ckc (Ω) denotes the set of
k-times differentiable functions with compact support in Ω.
2.2. Best Response Dynamics. We consider solutions of (1) in the following
sense.
Definition 6. We say that an absolutely-continuous mapping x : R → X is a
solution to (1) (or a best-response process) with initial condition x0 ∈ X if x(0) = x0
and (1) holds for almost every t ∈ R.
Since the right hand side of (1) is a set-valued map that is upper semi-continuous with
non-empty, compact, convex values, and is locally bounded, solutions in this sense are
guaranteed to exist [14].
2.3. Illustrative Example: BR Dynamics in a 2× 2 Game. The following
simple example illustrates several important properties of BR dynamics.
Example 7. Consider the two-player two-action game with the following payoffs.
A B
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 2, 2
Since players share identical payoffs, this is a potential game. The BR-dynamics
vector field for this game is illustrated in Figure 1 (where xi denotes the probability
of player i playing action B). Trajectories can only reach or converge to the mixed
equilibrium ((1/3), (1/3)) from a one-dimensional surface (stable manifold); this is
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illustrated in Figure 2. Furthermore, trajectories starting on the stable manifold will
reach the equilibrium in finite time. Since uniqueness of solutions is lost once the
mixed equilibrium is reached, solutions starting on this surface are not unique.
Fig. 1: BR-dynamics vector field in Ex-
ample 7.
Fig. 2: Stable manifold of the mixed equi-
librium in Example 7.
Two-player two-action games, such as the above example, possess a simple geo-
metric structure [35], and it is relatively straightforward to see that, so long as the
game is “non-degenerate”11 the following properties hold for BR-dynamics in 2 × 2
games:
Property 1. Solution curves can only reach mixed equilibria from a set of mea-
sure zero.
Property 2. Trajectories always converge to mixed equilibria in finite time.
Property 3. Though solutions are not generally unique, they are unique from
almost every initial condition.
Our results generalize this intuition to potential games of arbitrary size. Foremost,
Theorem 1 shows that Property 1 holds for BR dynamics in any regular potential
game.12 Proposition 30 shows that Property 2 holds for BR dynamics in any regular
potential game, and Proposition 3 shows that Property 3 holds for BR dynamics in
any regular potential game.
3. Regular Potential Games. The notion of a regular equilibrium was intro-
duced by Harsanyi [18]. Regular equilibria posses a variety of desirable robustness
properties [50].
Being a rather stringent refinement concept, not all games possess regular equi-
libria. However, “most” games do. A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the
game are regular. Harsanyi [18] showed that almost all N -player games are regular.
The set of potential games forms a low dimensional (Lebesgue-measure-zero) sub-
space within the space of all games. Thus, Harsanyi’s regularity result is inconclusive
about the prevalence of regular games within the subset of potential games. In a
11See, e.g., [38] Section 2 for a discussion of non-degenerate 2× 2 games.
12More precisely, Since BR dynamics are guaranteed to converge to the set of NE in potential
games [3], Property 1 is equivalent to the statement of Theorem 1.
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companion paper [49], we study this issue and show that “most” potential games are
regular (see [49], Theorem 1).
In this paper we will study the behavior of BR dynamics in regular potential
games. The purpose of this restriction is twofold. First, there are degenerate poten-
tial games in which BR dynamics do not converge for almost all initial conditions.
Restricting attention to regular potential games ensures that the game is not degen-
erate in this sense. Second, analysis of the behavior of the BR dynamics is easier near
equilibria that are regular. Regularity permits us to characterize the fundamental
properties of the potential function U without needing to look at anything higher
than second order terms in the Taylor series expansion of U . This substantially sim-
plifies the analysis.
If x∗ is a regular equilibrium of a potential game, then the derivatives of potential
function can be shown to satisfy two non-degeneracy conditions at x∗. The first
condition deals with the gradient of the potential function at x∗ and is referred to as
the first-order condition; the second condition deals with the Hessian of the potential
function at x∗ and is referred to as the second-order condition. These conditions,
introduced in Sections 3.1–3.2 below, will be crucial in the subsequent analysis.
3.1. First-Order Degeneracy. Let Γ be a potential game with potential func-
tion U . Following Harsanyi [18], we will define the carrier set of an element x ∈ X, a
natural modification of a support set to the present context. For xi ∈ Xi let
carri(xi) := spt(Ti(xi)) ⊆ Yi
and for x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X let carr(x) := carr1(x1) ∪ · · · ∪ carrN (xN ).
Let C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ CN , where for each i = 1, . . . , N , Ci is a nonempty subset
of Yi. We say that C is the carrier for x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X if Ci = carri(xi) for
i = 1, . . . , N (or equivalently, if C = carr(x)).
Let γi := |Ci| and assume that the strategy set Yi, is reordered so that Ci =
{y1i , . . . , yγii }. Under this ordering, the first γi−1 components of any strategy xi with
carri(xi) = Ci are free (not constrained to zero by Ci) and the remaining components
of xi are constrained to zero. That is (x
k
i )
γi−1
k=1 is free under Ci and (x
k
i )
Ki
k=γi
= 0. The
set of strategies {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C} is precisely the interior of the face of X given
by
(6) ΩC := {x ∈ X : xki = 0, k = γi, . . . ,Ki − 1, i = 1, . . . , N}.
Let x∗ be an equilibrium with carrier C. We say that x∗ is first-order degenerate
if there exists a pair (i, k), i = 1, . . . , N , k = γi, . . . ,Ki − 1 such that ∂U(x
∗)
∂xki
= 0, and
we say x∗ is first-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Remark 8. We note that using the multi-linearity of U , it is straightforward to
verify that an equilibrium is first order non-degenerate if and only if it is quasi-strong,
as introduced by Harsanyi [18] (see also [50]). In particular, an equilibrium x∗ is first-
order degenerate if and only if carri(x
∗
i ) ( BRi(x∗−i) for some i = 1, . . . , N . We prefer
to use the term first order non-degenerate since it emphasizes that we are concerned
with the gradient of the potential function and it keeps nomenclature consistent with
the notion of second-order non-degeneracy, introduced next.
3.2. Second-Order Degeneracy. Let C be some carrier set. Let N˜ := |{i =
1, . . . , N : γi ≥ 2}|, and assume that the player set is ordered so that γi ≥ 2 for
i = 1, . . . , N˜ . Under this ordering, for strategies with carr(x) = C, the first N˜ players
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use mixed strategies and the remaining players use pure strategies. Assume that
N˜ ≥ 1 so that any x with carrier C is a mixed (not pure) strategy.
Let the Hessian of U taken with respect to C be given by
(7) H˜(x) :=
(
∂2U(x)
∂xki ∂x
`
j
)
i,j=1,...,N˜,
k=1,...,γi−1,
`=1,...,γj−1
.
Note that this definition of the Hessian restricts attention to the components of x
that are free under C
We say an equilibrium x∗ ∈ X is second-order degenerate if the Hessian H˜(x∗)
taken with respect to carr(x∗) is singular, and we say x∗ is second-order non-degenerate
otherwise.
Remark 9. Note that both forms of degeneracy are concerned with the interaction
of the potential function and the “face” of the strategy space containing the equilibrium
x∗. If x∗ touches one or more constraints, then first-order non-degeneracy ensures that
the gradient of the potential function is nonzero normal to the face Ωcarr(x∗), defined
in (6). Second-order non-degeneracy ensures that, restricting U to the face Ωcarr(x∗),
the Hessian of U
∣∣
Ωcarr(x∗)
is non-singular. If x∗ is contained within the interior of
X, then the first-order condition becomes moot and the second-order condition reduces
to the standard definition of a non-degenerate critical point.
Remark 10. Note that if an equilibrium x∗ is (first or second-order) degenerate
with respect to some potential function U for the game Γ, then it is likewise degenerate
for every other admissible potential function for Γ. This justifies our usage of an
arbitrary potential function U associated with Γ in the definitions of first and second
order degeneracy.
Throughout the paper we will study regular potential games. The following
lemma from [49] shows that, in any regular potential game, all equilibria are first
and second-order non-degenerate.
Lemma 11 ( [49], Lemma 12). Let Γ be a potential game. An equilibrium x∗ is
regular if and only if it is both first and second-order non-degenerate.
4. Potential Production Inequalities. In this section we prove two key in-
equalities ((12) and (13)) that are the backbone of our proof of Theorem 1.
We note that in proving Theorem 1 there is a fundamental dichotomy between
studying completely mixed equilibria and incompletely mixed equilibria. Completely
mixed equilibria lie in the interior of the strategy space. At these points the gradi-
ent of the potential function is zero and the Hessian is non-singular; local analysis
of the dynamics is relatively easy. On the other hand, incompletely mixed equilibria
necessarily lie on the boundary of X and the potential function may have a nonzero
gradient at these points.13 Analysis of the dynamics around these points is funda-
mentally more delicate.
In order to handle incompletely mixed equilibria we construct a nonlinear projec-
tion whose range is a lower dimensional game in which the image of the equilibrium
under consideration is completely mixed. This allows us to handle both types of mixed
equilibria in a unified manner.
13We note that in games that are first-order non-degenerate, the gradient is always non-zero at
incompletely mixed equilibria.
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4.1. Projection to a Lower-Dimensional Game. Let x∗ be a mixed equi-
librium.14 Let Ci = carri(x
∗
i ), where x
∗
i is the player-i component of x
∗, let C =
C1 ∪ · · · ∪ CN = carr(x∗), and assume that Yi is ordered so that {y1i , . . . , yγii } = Ci.
Let γi = |Ci|, let N˜ :=
∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : γi ≥ 2}∣∣, and assume that the player set is
ordered so that γi ≥ 2 for i = 1, . . . , N˜ . Since x∗ is assumed to be a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, we have N˜ ≥ 1.
Given an x ∈ X, we will frequently use the decomposition x = (xp, xm), where
xm := (x
k
i )i=1,...,N˜, k=1,...,γi−1 and xp contains the remaining components of x.
15 Let
γ :=
∑N
i=1(γi − 1). Recalling that κ is the dimension of X (see (4)), note that for
x ∈ X we have x ∈ Rκ, xm ∈ Rγ , and xp ∈ Rκ−γ .
The set of joint pure strategies Y may be expressed as an ordered set Y =
{y1, . . . , yK} where each element yτ ∈ Y , τ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is an N -tuple of strategies.
For each pure strategy yτ ∈ Y , τ = 1, . . . ,K, let uτ denote the pure-strategy potential
associated with playing yτ ; that is, uτ := u(yτ ), where u is the pure form of the
potential function defined in Section 2. A vector of potential coefficients u = (uτ )Kτ=1
is an element of RK .
Given a vector of potential coefficients u ∈ RK and a strategy x ∈ X, let16
(8) F ki (x, u) :=
∂U(x)
∂xki
,
for i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k = 1, . . . , γi − 1, and let
F (x, u) :=
(
F ki (x, u)
)
i=1,...,N˜
k=1,...,γi−1
=
(
∂U(x)
∂xki
)
i=1,...,N˜
k=1,...,γi−1
.
Differentiating (5) we see that at the equilibrium x∗ we have ∂U(x
∗)
∂xki
= 0 for i =
1, . . . , N˜ , k = 1, . . . , γi − 1 (see Lemma 38 in appendix), or equivalently,
F (x∗, u) = F (x∗p, x
∗
m, u) = 0.
By Definition 5, the (mixed) equilibrium x∗ is completely mixed if γ = κ, and is
incompletely mixed otherwise. Suppose γ < κ so that x∗ is incompletely mixed. Let
J(x) := DxmF (xp, xm, u) and note that by definition we have J(x
∗) = H˜(x∗).
Since Γ is assumed to be a non-degenerate game, J(x∗) is invertible. By the im-
plicit function theorem, there exists a function g : D(g)→ Rγ such that F (xp, g(xp), u)
= 0 for all xp in a neighborhood of x
∗
p, where D(g) ⊂ Rκ−γ denotes the domain of g,
x∗p ∈ D(g), and D(g) is open.
The graph of g is given by
Graph(g) := {x ∈ X : x = (xp, xm), xp ∈ D(g), xm = g(xp)}.
Note that Graph(g) is a smooth manifold with Hausdorff dimension (κ− γ) [13]. An
intuitive interpretation of Graph(g) is given in Remark 17.
14We note that x∗ is assumed to be fixed throughout the section and many of the subsequently
defined terms are implicitly dependent on x∗.
15The subscript in xm is suggestive of “mixed-strategy components” and the subscript in xp is
suggestive of “pure-strategy components”. Furthermore, it is convenient to note that under the
assumed ordering {y1i , . . . , yγii } = Ci we have x∗p = 0; i.e., the pure strategy component at the
equilibrium is equal to the null vector.
16We note that the functions Fki and F defined here are identical to those defined in (12) and
(13) of [49], and used extensively throughout [49].
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If Γ is a non-degenerate potential game then, using the multilinarity of U , we see
that γ ≥ 2 (see Lemma 35 in appendix). This implies that
(9) Graph(g) has Hausdorff dimension at most (κ− 2).
Let Ω := ΩC , where ΩC is defined in (6), denote the face of X containing x
∗.
Define the mapping P˜ : D(P˜)→ Ω, with domain D(P˜) := {x = (xp, xm) ∈ X : xp ∈
D(g)}, as follows. If x∗ is completely mixed then let P˜(x) := x be the identity.
Otherwise, let
(10) P˜(x) := x∗ + (x− (xp, g(xp))) .
Let P˜ki (x) be the (i, k)-th coordinate map of P˜, so that P˜ = (P˜ki ) i=1,...,N
k=1,...,Ki−1
. Follow-
ing the definitions, it is simple to verify that for x ∈ D(P˜) we have P˜ki (x) = 0 for all
(i, k) with k ≥ γi, and hence P˜ indeed maps into Ω.
Let X˜i := {x˜i ∈ Rγi−1 : x˜ki ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , γi − 1,
∑γi−1
k=1 x˜
k
i ≤ 1}, i = 1, . . . , N˜ ,
and let X˜ := X˜1 × · · · × X˜N˜ . Let P : D(P)→ X˜ with domain D(P) = D(P˜) ⊂ X be
given by
(11) P := (P˜ki )i=1,...,N˜, k=1,...,γi−1.
Note that P contains the components of P˜ not constrained to zero. As we will see in
the following section, P may be interpreted as a projection into a lower dimensional
game in which P(x∗) is a completely mixed equilibrium.
Example 12. Consider the two player game with payoff matrix.
A B C
A 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0
B 0, 0 2, 2 0, 0
We will refer to the row player as player 1 and the column player as player 2.
Note that this is equivalent to the game in Example 7 where the player 2 has been given
an additional action yielding a uniform payoff of zero for both players. Following the
conventions of Section 2.1, let x11 denote the probability of player 1 playing action B,
and let x12 and x
2
2 denote the probabilities of player 2 playing B and C, respectively.
The mixed strategy space X for this game is a triangular cylinder—a plot of the BRD
vector field for this game is shown from two different perspectives in Figures 3a–3b,
where the blue arrows give the direction of the vector field, and the green surfaces
represent regions where some player is indifferent between actions (i.e., “indifference
surfaces”). Note that the vector field jumps along these surfaces.
Let Ω denote the face of X corresponding to x22 = 0 (i.e., the face of X when we
restrict player 2 to place weight 0 on action C). Note that the vector field within Ω
is identical to the familiar 2× 2 vector field from Example 7.
Let x∗ be the equilibrium ((x11), (x
1
2, x
2
2)) = ((1/3), (1/3, 0)). The graph of the
associated function g coincides with intersection of the indifference surfaces emanating
from x∗ out of Ω. (In general, the graph of g will always correspond to the intersection
of indifference surfaces connecting to the equilibrium and extending out of Ω.) The
projection P projects strategies from X into the face Ω as defined in (10) and (11).
Fifty solution curves of the BR dynamics in this game with random initial con-
ditions are plotted in red in Figures 3c–3d. Note that the solution curves converge to
pure equilibria.
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(a) BRD vector field from Example 12.
(b) Alternate view of BRD vector field
from Example 12.
(c) Plot of BR solution curves from Ex-
ample 12.
(d) Alternate view of plot of BR solution
curves from Example 12.
Fig. 3
4.2. Inequalities. Let U˜ : X˜ → R be given by
U˜(x˜) := U(x∗p, x˜),
where x∗ = (x∗p, x
∗
m) is the mixed equilibrium fixed in the beginning of the section.
Let Γ˜ be a potential game with player set {1, . . . , N˜}, mixed-strategy space X˜i, i =
1, . . . , N˜ , and potential function U˜ . By construction, P(x∗) is a completely mixed
equilibrium of Γ˜. Moreover, by the definition of a non-degenerate equilibrium, the
Hessian of U˜ is invertible at P(x∗).
We are interested in studying the projection P(x(t)) of a BR process into the
lower dimensional game Γ˜.17 We wish to show that the following two inequalities
hold:
17In the lower dimensional game Γ˜, the dynamics of the projected process are not precisely BR
dynamics. However, the behave nearly like BR dynamics, which is what allows us to establish these
inequalities.
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(i) For x in a neighborhood of x∗
(12)
∣∣U˜(P(x∗))− U˜(P(x))∣∣ ≤ c1d2(P(x),P(x∗)),
for some constant c1 > 0.
(ii) Suppose (x(t))t≥0 is a BR process. For x(t) residing in a neighborhood of x∗
(13)
d
dt
U˜(P(x(t))) ≥ c2d(P(x(t)),P(x∗)),
for some constant c2 > 0.
18
The first inequality follows from Taylor’s theorem and the fact that ∇U˜(P(x∗)) =
0. The following two sections are devoted to proving (13). In order to build intuition
and
In Section 4.3 we consider the simple case in which x∗ is a completely mixed
(interior) equilibrium. Subsequently, in Section 4.4 we consider the more complicated
case in which x∗ is an incompletely mixed equilibrium. The basic idea of the proof
of (13) in the completely and incompletely mixed cases is the same. However, care
must be taken to appropriately handle problems with possible first-order degeneracies
occurring at incompletely mixed equilibria. The reader may wish to skip Section 4.4
on a first read-through.
4.3. Proving the Differential Inequality: The Completely Mixed Case.
We begin with Lemma 13 which shows—roughly speaking—that within the interior
of the action space, the BR-dynamics vector field approximates the gradient field of
the potential function.
The following definitions are useful in the lemma. For B ⊆ X, let PXi(B) :=
{xi ∈ Xi : (xi, x−i) ∈ B for some x−i ∈ X−i} be the projection of B onto Xi. Given
an xi ∈ Xi, let
d(xi, ∂Xi) := min{x1i , . . . , xKi−1i , 1−
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki }
denote the distance from xi to the boundary of Xi. Let
d(PXi(B), ∂Xi) := inf
xi∈PXi (B)
d(xi, ∂Xi)
denote the distance between the set PXi(B) and the boundary of Xi.
Since we will eventually be interested in studying a lower-dimensional game de-
rived from Γ, in the lemma we consider an alternative game Γˆ of arbitrary size.
Lemma 13. Let Γˆ be a potential game with player set {1, . . . , Nˆ}, action sets
Yˆi, i = 1, . . . , Nˆ , with cardinality Kˆi := |Yˆi|, and potential function Uˆ . Let Xˆ =
Xˆ1 × · · · × XˆNˆ denote the mixed strategy space.
Let B ⊂ Xˆ and fix i ∈ {1, . . . , Nˆ}. Then for all x ∈ B there holds
(14) zi · ∇xiUˆ(x) ≥ c‖∇xiUˆ(x)‖1, ∀ zi ∈ BRi(x−i)− xi
where the constant c is given by c = d(PXi(B), ∂Xˆi).
18We note that when we write these inequalities, we mean they are satisfied in an integrated sense
(e.g., as used in (40)–(41)). In this section, we treat all of these as pointwise inequalities. A rigorous
argument could be constructed using the chain rule in Sobolev spaces (see, for example, [27]).
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Proof. Let x ∈ B. If ‖∇xiUˆ(x)‖1 = 0, then ∇xiUˆ(x) = 0, and the inequality is
trivially satisfied. Suppose from now on that ‖∇xiUˆ(x)‖1 > 0.
Without loss of generality, assume that Yi is ordered so that
(15) y1i ∈ BRi(x−i).
Differentiating (5) we find that19
(16)
∂Uˆ(x)
∂xki
= Uˆ(yk+1i , x−i)− Uˆ(y1i , x−i).
Together with (15), this implies that for k = 1, . . . , Kˆi − 1 we have
(17) yk+1i ∈ BRi(x−i) ⇐⇒
∂Uˆ(x)
∂xki
= 0.
Using the multlinearity of Uˆ we see that if ξi ∈ BRi(x−i) and ξki > 0 then yk+1i ∈
BRi(x−i). But, by (17) this implies that if ξi ∈ BRi(x−i) and ξki > 0 then ∂Uˆ(x)∂xki = 0.
Noting that any ξi ∈ BRi(x−i) is necessarily coordinatewise nonnegative, this gives
(ξi − xi) · ∇xiUˆ(x) =
Kˆi−1∑
k=1
ξki
∂Uˆ(x)
∂xki︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
Kˆi−1∑
k=1
xki
∂Uˆ(x)
∂xki
, ξi ∈ BRi(x−i)(18)
Since we assume x ∈ B, we have xki ≥ d(PXˆi(B), ∂Xˆi), for all k = 1, . . . , Kˆi−1. Since
we assume y1i ∈ BRi(x−i), from (16) we get that ∂Uˆ(x)∂xki ≤ 0 for all k = 1, . . . , Kˆi − 1.
Substituting into (18), this gives
(19) (ξi − xi) · ∇xiUˆ(x) ≥ d(PXˆi(B), ∂Xˆi)
Kˆi−1∑
k=1
(
−∂Uˆ(x)
∂xki
)
, ξi ∈ BRi(x−i).
But since ∂Uˆ(x)
∂xki
≤ 0 for all k we have ∑Kˆi−1k=1 (−∂Uˆ(x)∂xki ) = ‖∇xiUˆ(x)‖1, and hence
(ξi − xi) · ∇xiUˆ(x) ≥ d(PXˆi(B), ∂Xˆi)‖∇xiUˆ(x)‖1, ξi ∈ BRi(x−i),
which is the desired result.
Remark 14. Since the space Xi in Lemma 13 is finite dimensional, given any
norm ‖ · ‖, there exists a constant c˜ > 0 such that
zi · ∇xiU(x) ≥ c‖∇xiU(x)‖, ∀ zi ∈ BRi(x−i)− xi
with c = c˜d(PXi(B), ∂Xi).
19Note that the domain of (expected) potential function Uˆ may be trivially extended to an open
neighborhood around Xˆ (see Section 2). Using this extension we see that the derivative is well
defined for x lying on the boundary of Xˆ.
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The following lemma proves (13) for the case in which x∗ is a completely mixed
equilibrium. Note that in this case the projection P is given by the identity, so (13)
becomes
(20)
d
dt
U(x(t)) ≥ c2d(x(t), x∗).
Lemma 15. Suppose x∗ is a completely mixed equilibrium. Then (20) holds for
x(t) in a neighborhood of x∗.
Proof. Note that
d
dt
U(x(t)) = ∇U(x(t)) · x˙(t) =
N∑
i=1
∇iU(x(t)) · zi
for some zi ∈ BRi(x−i)− xi. By Lemma 13 this gives
d
dt
U(x(t)) ≥
N∑
i=1
c‖∇xiU(x)‖.
By the equivalence of finite-dimensional norms, there exists a constant c1 such that
d
dtU(x(t)) ≥ c1‖∇U(x(t))‖ for x(t) in a neighborhood of x∗. Since Γ is assumed to be
regular (and hence second-order non-degenerate), x∗ is a non-degenerate critical point
of U . By Lemma 40 (see appendix) there exists a constant c2 such that c1‖∇U(x)‖ ≥
c2d(x, x
∗) for x in a neighborhood of x∗, and hence ddtU(x(t)) ≥ c2d(x(t), x∗).
4.4. Proving the Differential Inequality: The Incompletely Mixed Case.
In this section we prove (13) for the case in which x∗ is incompletely mixed. The main
idea of the proof is the same as the proof in the completely mixed case. However, care
must be taken to ensure that x(t) approaches the boundary of X in an appropriate
manner. Handling this case is the principal role of the first-order non-degeneracy
condition.
For each x = (xp, xm) ∈ X near to x∗, the following lemma allows us to define an
additional lower dimensional game Γxp associated with xp in which the best-response
set is closely related to the best-response set for the original game Γ. The lemma is
a straightforward consequence of the definition of the best response correspondence
and the continuity of ∇U .
Lemma 16. For x in a neighborhood of x∗, the best response set satisfies
BRi(x−i) ⊆ BRi(x∗−i), ∀ i = 1, . . . , N˜ .
Given any x = (xp, xm) ∈ X we define U˜xp : X˜ → R and
∼
BRxp,i: X˜−i ⇒ X˜i as
follows. For x˜ ∈ X˜ let
(21) U˜xp(x˜) := U(xp, x˜),
and for x˜−i ∈ X˜−i let
(22)
∼
BRxp,i (x˜−i) := arg max
x˜i∈X˜i
U˜xp(x˜i, x˜−i)
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Let Γxp be the potential game with player set {1, . . . , N˜}, mixed strategy space
X˜ and potential function U˜xp . Note that since U is continuous and X˜ is compact,
U˜xp converges uniformly to U˜x∗p =: U˜ as xp → x∗p. In this sense the game Γxp can be
seen as converging to Γ˜ as xp → x∗p.
Remark 17. The function g defined in Section 4.1 admits the following inter-
pretation. Suppose we fix some xp = (x
k
i )i=1,...,N, k=γi,...,Ki−1. Then g(xp) is a
completely mixed Nash equilibrium of Γxp . Moreover, if we let xp → x∗p, then the cor-
responding equilibrium of the reduced game Γxp converges to x
∗, i.e., (xp, g(xp)) →
(x∗p, g(x
∗
p)) = x
∗, precisely along Graph(g). (See Example 12 for an illustration.)
Remark 18. Suppose x∗ is a first-order non-degenerate equilibrium. Using the
multilinearity of U we see that for any x ∈ X we have carri(xi) ⊆ BRi(x−i). By
Remark 8, at x∗ we have carri(x∗i ) = BRi(x
∗
−i). Due to the ordering we assumed on
Yi, this implies that y
k
i ∈ BRi(x∗−i) ⇐⇒ 1 ≤ k ≤ γi. Moving to the X domain,
this means that if xˆi ∈ BRi(x∗−i), then xˆki = 0 for all k = γi, . . . ,Ki − 1. By Lemma
16, this implies that for all x in a neighborhood of x∗ and for xˆi ∈ BRi(x−i) we have
(xˆki )
Ki−1
k=γi
= 0.
The following lemma extends the result of Lemma 13 so it applies in a useful way
to the potential function U˜ under the projection P.
Lemma 19. There exists a constant c > 0 such that for all x = (xp, xm) in a
neighborhood of x∗ and all η ∈ Rγi−1 with ‖η‖ sufficiently small we have
(zi + η) · ∇xiU˜(P(x)) ≥ c‖∇xiU˜(P(x))‖,
for all zi ∈ ∼BRi,xp ([xm]−i)− [xm]i, where [xm]i := (xki )k=1,...,γi−1 refers to the player-
i component of xm and [xm]−i contains the components of xm corresponding to the
remaining players.
The proof of this lemma is relatively straightforward and omitted for brevity.
Finally, the following lemma shows that the differential inequality (13) holds.
Lemma 20. Let Γ be a non-degenerate potential game with mixed equilibrium x∗,
and let (x(t))t≥0 be a BR process. Then the inequality (13) holds for x(t) in a neigh-
borhood of x∗.
Proof. Let
P(x) :=
(
∂P˜ki
∂x`j
)
i=1,...,N˜,k=1,...,γi−1
j=1,...,N, `=γi,...,Ki−1
where the partial derivatives are evaluated at x. The Jacobian of P˜ evaluated at x is
given by (
∂P˜ki
∂x`j
)
i,j=1,...,N,
k,`=1,...,Ki−1
=
(
I P(x)
0 0
)
.
Using the chain rule we may express the time derivative of the potential along the
path P˜(x(t)) as
d
dt
U(P˜(x(t))) = ∇U(P˜(x(t)))
(
I P(x)
0 0
)
x˙ = ∇xmU(P˜(x(t)))(I P(x))x˙.
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For i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k = 1, . . . , γi − 1 let ηki (t) :=
∑N
j=1
∑Ki−1
`=γj
∂P˜ki
∂x`j
x˙`i , let ηi(t) :=
(ηki (t))
γi−1
k=1 , and let η(t) = (ηi(t))
N˜
i=1. Multiplying out the right two terms above we
get
(23)
d
dt
U(P˜(x(t))) = ∇xmU(P˜(x(t))) (x˙m + η(t))
By Lemma 16 and Remark 18, if we restrict x(t) to a sufficiently small neighborhood
of x∗ then for any zi = (z′i, z
′′
i ) ∈ BRi(x−i(t)), z′i = (zki )γi−1k=1 , z′′i = (zki )Ki−1k=γi , we have
z′i ∈
∼
BRxp,i ([xm]−i) and z
′′
i = 0. We note two important consequences of this:
(i) If we restrict x(t) to a sufficiently small neighborhood of x∗ and note that
U(P˜(x(t))) = U˜(P(x(t)), then by (23) we have
d
dt
U˜(P(x(t))) = ∇U˜(P(x(t))) ·
 z1(t) + η1(t)...
zN˜ (t) + ηN˜ (t)
(24)
=
N˜∑
i=1
∇xiU˜(P(x(t))) · (zi(t) + ηi(t)),
where zi(t) ∈ ∼BRxp(t),i ([xm(t)]−i)− [xm(t)]i.
(ii) We may force maxi=1,...,N˜ ‖ηi‖ to be arbitrarily small by restricting x(t) to a
neighborhood of x∗.
Consequence (i) follows readily by using the definition of the BR dynamics (1).
To show consequence (ii), note that by (1) we have x˙ki = z
k
i − xki for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
k = 1, . . . ,Ki, for some zi ∈ BRi(x−i). But, for x in a neighborhood of x∗ and
k ≥ γi, we have shown above that zki = 0, and hence x˙ki = −xki .20 Due the ordering
we assumed for Yi, we have [x
∗]ki = 0 for any (i, k) such that k ≥ γi. Hence, xki → 0
as x→ x∗, for any (i, k) such that k ≥ γi.
Furthermore, there exists a c > 0 such that |∂P˜ki (x)
∂x`j
| < c, i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k =
1, . . . , γi − 1, j = 1, . . . , N , ` ≥ γj uniformly for x in a neighborhood of x∗ (see
Lemma 39 in appendix). By the definition of ηi, this implies that maxi=1,...,N˜ ‖ηi‖
may be made arbitrarily small by restricting x(t) to a sufficiently small neighborhood
of x∗.
Now, let x(t) be restricted to a sufficiently small neighborhood of x∗ so that
‖ηi(t)‖ is small enough to apply Lemma 19 for each i. Applying Lemma 19 to (24)
we get ddt U˜(P(x(t))) ≥
∑N˜
i=1 c‖∇xiU˜(P(x(t)))‖ for x(t) in a neighborhood of x∗.
By the equivalence of finite-dimensional norms, there exists a constant c1 such that
d
dt U˜(P(x(t))) ≥ c1‖∇U˜(P(x(t)))‖ for x(t) in a neighborhood of x∗.
Since Γ is assumed to be (second-order) non-degenerate, P(x∗) is a non-degenerate
critical point of U˜ . By Lemma 40 (see appendix) there exists a constant c2 such that
c1‖∇U˜(x˜)‖ ≥ c2d(x˜,P(x∗)) for all x˜ ∈ X˜ in a neighborhood of P(x∗). Since P is
continuous we have ddt U˜(P(x(t))) ≥ c2d(P(x(t)),P(x∗)), for x(t) in a neighborhood
of x∗.
20We note that this particular step depends crucially on the assumption of first-order non-
degeneracy (see Remark 18).
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5. Proof of Main Result. We will assume throughout this section that Γ is a
regular potential game. By Theorem 1 of [49], the ensuing results hold for almost all
potential games.
For each mixed equilibrium x∗, let the set Λ(x∗) ⊂ X be defined as
Λ(x∗) :=
{
{x∗} if x∗ is completely mixed,
Graph(g) otherwise,
where g is defined with respect to x∗ as in Section 4.1.
In this section we will prove Theorem 1 in two steps. First, we will show that
for each mixed equilibrium x∗, the set Λ(x∗) can only be reached in finite time from
an Lκ-null set of initial conditions (see Proposition 21), where κ, defined in (4), is
the dimension of X. Second, we will show that if a BR process converges to the
set Λ(x∗), then it must do so in finite time (see Proposition 30). Since x∗ ∈ Λ(x∗),
Propositions 21 and 30 together show that for any mixed equilibrium x∗, the set of
initial conditions from which BR dynamics converge to x∗ has Lκ-measure zero.
By Theorem 2 of [49] we see that in regular potential games, the set of NE is
finite. Hence, Propositions 21 and 30 imply that BR dynamics can only converge to
set of mixed strategy equilibria from a Lκ-null set of initial conditions. Since a BR
process must converge to the set of NE in a potential game ( [3], Theorem 5.5), this
implies that Theorem 1 holds.
5.1. Finite-Time Convergence. The goal of this subsection is to prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 21. Let Γ be a non-degenerate game and let x∗ be a mixed-strategy
NE of Γ. The set Λ(x∗) can only be reached by a BR process in finite time from a set
of initial conditions with Lκ-measure zero. That is,
Lκ({x0 ∈ X : x(0) = x0, x(t) is a BR process,
x(t) ∈ Λ(x∗) for some t ∈ [0,∞)}) = 0.
We will take the following approach in proving the proposition. First, we will es-
tablish that solutions of (1) are unique (over a finite-time horizon) almost everywhere
in X (see Lemma 24). We will then show that—in an appropriate measure-theoretic
sense—the BR-dynamics vector field has bounded divergence (see Lemma 26). The
practical implication of this result will be that BR dynamics cannot compress a set
of positive measure into a set of zero measure in finite time. Since Λ(x∗) is a low-
dimensional set (see below), we will see that this implies that the set from which
Λ(x∗) can be reached in finite time cannot have positive measure, which will prove
the proposition.
Before proving the proposition we present some definitions and preliminary re-
sults. Let
(25) Ii,k,` := {(xi, x−i) ∈ X : U(yki , x−i) = U(y`i , x−i)},
for i = 1, . . . , N , k, ` = 1, . . . ,Ki, ` 6= k, be the set in which player i is indifferent
between his k-th and `-th actions.
If the game Γ is non-degenerate, then each Ii,k,` is the union of smooth surfaces
with Hausdorff dimension at most (k−1) (see Lemma 44 in appendix). In particular,
for each x ∈ Ii,k,` there exists a vector ν ∈ Rκ that is normal to Ii,k,` at x. We refer
to the set Ii,k,` as an indifference surface of player i.
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We define the set Q˜ ⊆ X as follows. Let Q˜ contain the set of points where
two or more indifference surfaces intersect and their normal vectors do not coincide.
Furthermore, if an indifference surface I has a component Iˆ ⊆ I with Hausdorff
dimension less than κ − 1, then we put any points where Iˆ intersects with another
decision surface into Q˜. Since each indifference surface is smooth with dimension at
most κ− 1, Q˜ has Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2. Let
Q := Q˜ ∪ Λ(x∗).
As shown in Section 4.1, if x∗ is non-degenerate, then the set Graph(g) (and hence
Λ(x∗)) has Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2. Thus Q has Hausdorff dimension at
most κ− 2.21
The BR-dynamics vector field (see (1)) is given by the map BRD : X ⇒ X, where
(26) BRD(x) := BR(x)− x.
Let
Z := {x ∈ X\Q : x ∈ Ii,k,` for some i, k, ` with normal ν at x,(27)
and ν · z = 0 for some z ∈ BRD(x)}.
Since each Ii,k,` has Hausdorff dimension at most κ−1, Z has Hausdorff dimension
at most κ−1. We define the relative boundary of Z, denoted here as ∂Z as follows. If Z
has Hausdorff dimension κ−2 or less, then let ∂Z := Z. If Z has Hausdorff dimension
κ − 1 then it may be expressed as the union of a finite number of smooth (κ − 1)-
dimensional surfaces, denoted here as (Zs)Nzs=1, 1 ≤ Nz < ∞, and a component with
Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2, denoted here as Z ′. That is, Z = (⋃Nzs=1Zs)∪Z ′.
Each Zs, s = 1, . . . , Nz is contained in some indifference surface, which we denote here
as Is. Define the relative interior of Zs (with respect to Is) as riZs := {x ∈ Zs : ∃ >
0 s.t. B(x, )∩Is ⊂ Zs}, and define the relative boundary of Zs as ∂Zs := clZs\riZs.
We then define the relative boundary of Z as
∂Z :=
(
Nz⋃
s=1
∂Zs
)
∪ Z ′.
Note that ∂Z is a set with Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2. By Lemma 47 in the
appendix, the BR-dynamics vector field is oriented tangentially along Z, in the sense
that for any x ∈ Z there holds ν · y = 0 for any vector ν normal to Z at x, and any
y ∈ BRD(x). This implies that BR paths can only enter or exit Z through ∂Z.
Let
X∗ := X\ (Q ∪ Z)
Example 22. Consider the 3-player 2-action identical payoffs game with the (iden-
tical) utility function given in Figure 4b We will refer to the column player as player
1, the row player as player 2, and the remaining player as player 3. If player 3 plays
action A (respectively B), then the game is reduced to a 2× 2 game with BRD vector
field shown in Figure 5a (Figure 5b), where the first subgame is familiar from Example
7. The strategy space X of the full game is a 3-dimensional cube—the BRD vector
21Proposition 21 can easily be generalized to say that any set A ⊂ X such that clA has Hausdorff
dimension at most κ − 2, can only be reached in finite time from a set of Lκ-measure zero by
substituting A for Λ(x∗) throughout the section.
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A B
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 2, 2
(a) Player 3 plays A
A B
A 3, 3 0, 0
B 0, 0 6, 6
(b) Player 3 plays B
Fig. 4: Utility structure for game in Example 22
field for this game is visualized in Figures 5c–5d, where the blue arrows represent the
vector field and the green surfaces represent indifference surfaces. A plot of 70 BRD
trajectories with random initializations is shown in Figure 5f. Note that within the
face x3 = 0 (respectively, x3 = 1) the vector field coincides with the 2× 2 vector field
in Figure 5a (Figure 5b). Note also that the vector field jumps at the indifference
surfaces.
The indifference surfaces are explicitly given by Ii = {x : xi = 1+5x33+6x3 }, i = 1, 2
and I3 = ∅ (since players have only two actions, we drop the additional sub-indices
on I). The game has one (incompletely) mixed equilibrium at x∗ = (23 , 23 , 1). The
graph of the map g associated with this equilibrium (see Section 4.1) coincides with
the set I1 ∩ I2 (cf. Example 12). The set Q is given by
Q = I1 ∩ I2 =
{
x : x1 = x2 =
1 + 5x3
3 + 6x3
}
.
Note that this contains the set Λ(x∗) = Graph(g) and all points at which indifference
surfaces intersect.
Figure 5e shows a side view of the 3D BRD vector field. The surface I2 is seen
from this angle as the green curve. The BRD vector field is tangential to I2 at any
point x with (x1, x3) = (
1
2 ,
1
4 ), x2 ≥ 12 . A similar situation holds for I1.
From this we see that set Z (the sub-manifold where trajectories may enter some
indifference surface tangentially) is given by
Z = Z1 ∪ Z2,
where Z1 = {x : (x2, x3) := ( 12 , 14 ), x1 ≥ 12} and Z2 := {x : (x1, x3) = ( 12 , 14 ), x2 ≥
1
2}. The following technical lemma will be used to show that the BR dynamics are
well posed within X∗ (see Lemma 24). It is a consequence of the fact that the BR-
dynamics vector field can only have jumps that are tangential to indifference surfaces.
Lemma 23. Suppose x ∈ X∗ is in some indifference surface Ii,k,`. Then there
exists a constant c > 0 and a vector ν that is normal to Ii,k,` at x, such that
ν · z ≥ c, ∀ z ∈ BRD(x˜)
for all x˜ ∈ X∗ in a neighborhood of x.
Proof. By the definition of Ii,k,`, if x ∈ Ii,k,` then for all xˆ ∈ X such that
xˆ−i = x−i we have xˆ ∈ Ii,k,`. This implies that for any vector ν that is normal to
Ii,k,`, the (i,m)-th component of ν must be zero for all m = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1.
Suppose that x ∈ X∗ ∩ Ii,k,`. Since x 6∈ Q, there is a neighborhood of x in
which no indifference surface intersects with Ii,k,`. This implies that for x˜ within a
neighborhood of x, BR−i(x˜) = a−i for some a−i that is a vertex of X−i.
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(a) Reduced 2×2 BRD vector field
along face x3 = 0 in Example 22.
(b) Reduced 2×2 vector field along
face x3 = 1 in Example 22.
(c) BRD vector field for game in Example 22.
(d) Alternate view of BRD vector
field for game in Example 22.
(e) Side view of BRD vector field
showing I2 in Example 22. (f) BRD trajectories in Example 22.
Fig. 5
Together, these two facts imply that for all x˜ in a neighborhood of x, we have
ν · z′ = ν · z′′ for all z′ ∈ BR(x), z′′ ∈ BR(x˜), for any vector ν that is normal to Ii,k,`
at x. Since x /∈ Z, recalling the form of BRD (26), this means we can choose a vector
ν that is normal to Ii,k,` at x and a constant c > 0 such that ν · z > c for z ∈ BRD(x˜)
for all x˜ in a neighborhood of x.
The following lemma gives a well-posedness result for the BR dynamics inside
X∗.
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Lemma 24. For any x0 ∈ X∗, there exists a T ∈ (0,∞] and a unique absolutely-
continuous function x : [0, T ]→ X∗, with x(0) = x0, solving the differential inclusion
d
dtx(t) ∈ BRD(x(t)) for almost all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. If x ∈ X∗ is not on any indifference surface, then BRD is single valued in
a neighborhood of x, and (1) is (locally) a Lipschitz differential equation with unique
local solution.
Suppose that x0 ∈ X∗ is on an indifference surface I. By Lemma 23 there exists
a constant c > 0 such that for all x˜ in a neighborhood of x we have BRD(x˜) · ν > c,
where ν is a normal vector to I at x. This implies that for δ > 0 sufficiently small we
have {t ∈ [−δ, δ] : x(t) ∈ I} = {0}. Furthermore, since x 6∈ Q, for δ > 0 sufficiently
small we have
(28) {t ∈ [−δ, δ] : x(t) ∈ Ii,k,`, for any i, k, `} = {0}.
Now, let x0 ∈ X∗ and let (x(t))t≥0 and (z(t))t≥0 be two solutions to (1) with
x(0) = z(0) = x0. If (x(t))t≥0 never crosses an indifference surface, then the flow
is always classical and the two solutions always coincide; i.e., x(t) = z(t), t ≥ 0.
Suppose that (x(t))t≥0 does cross an indifference surface and let t∗ ≥ 0 be first time
when such a crossing occurs. For t < t∗, the flow is classical and we have x(t) = z(t)
for t ≤ t∗.
By (28) we see that for δ > 0 sufficiently small, x(t) is not in any indifference
surface for t ∈ [t∗−δ, t∗+δ]\{t∗}. Suppose that at time t = t∗+δ we have x(t) = xˆ 6=
zˆ = z(t). Let (x˜(τ))τ≥0 and (z˜(τ))τ≥0 be solutions to the time-reversed BR-dynamics
flow with x˜(0) = xˆ and z˜(0) = zˆ.
Since xˆ 6= zˆ, and since the time-reversed flow is classical for 0 ≤ τ < δ (in
particular, of the form x˙ = a+ x for some constant a), we get x˜(δ) 6= z˜(δ). But this
is impossible because the paths (x(t))t≥0 and (z(t))t≥0 are absolutely continuous and
we already established that x˜(δ) = x(t∗) = z(t∗) = z˜(δ).
Remark 25. We emphasize that Lemma 24 only shows uniqueness for a finite-
time horizon. Uniqueness for an infinite-time horizon will be obtained at a later point
(see Section 5.2).
Having established the well-posedness of BR dynamics in X∗ (and hence, almost
everywhere in X) we will now proceed to show that, in some appropriate sense,
the BR-dynamics vector field has bounded divergence (see Lemma 26). Of course,
BRD (26) is a discontinuous set-valued function and the divergence of BRD in the
classical sense is not well defined. Instead, we will find it convenient to view BRD as
a function of bounded variation and consider an appropriate measure-theoretic notion
of divergence for BRD. With this in mind, we will now briefly introduce the notion
of a function of bounded variation and an appropriate notion of divergence for such
functions.
As a matter of notation, we say that λ is a signed measure on Rκ if there exists
a Radon measure µ on Rκ and a µ-measurable function σ : Rκ → {−1, 1} such that
(29) λ(K) =
∫
K
σdµ
for all compact sets K ⊂ Rκ. When convenient, we write σµ to denote the signed
measure λ in (29).
Letting elements x ∈ X be written componentwise as (xs)κs=1, we recall [13] that
a function u ∈ L1(Ω) (with Ω ⊆ Rκ, Ω open) is a function of bounded variation
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(i.e., a BV function) if there exist finite signed Radon measures Dsu such that the
integration by parts formula
(30)
∫
Ω
u
∂φ
∂xs
dx = −
∫
Ω
φdDsu
holds for all φ ∈ C∞c (Ω). The measure Dsu is called the weak, or distributional, partial
derivative of u with respect to xs. We let Du := (Dsu)s=1,...,κ.
The measure Du can be uniquely decomposed into three parts [1] [cite other BV
book]
(31) Du = ∇uLκ + Cu+ Ju.
Here Ju is supported on a set Ju with Hausdorff dimension κ− 1, and Cu is singular
with respect to Lκ and satisfies Cu(E) = 0 for all sets E with finite Hκ−1 measure.
The L1 function ∇u is analogous to a classical derivative, and in particular if u
is differentiable on an open set V then Du = ∇uLκ on that set, with ∇u matching
the classical derivative. Furthermore, if u jumps across a smooth (κ− 1)-dimensional
hypersurface, then for x on the hypersurface we have
(32) Du = Ju = (u+ − u−)νdHκ−1,
where u+ is the value of u on one side of the surface, u− is the value on the other,
and ν is the normal vector pointing from u− to u+ [1].
A vector-valued function f ∈ L1(Ω : Rκ) is a function of bounded variation if each
of its components is also of bounded variation. Letting f be written componentwise
as f = (fs)κs=1, we write Df := (Djf
s)j,s=i,...,κ.
Next we define the divergence of a function f ∈ L1(Ω : Rκ), denoted by D · f , as
the measure
D · f :=
κ∑
s=1
Dsf
s.
Given a constant c ∈ R, we say that D · f = c if D · f = dD·fdLκ Lκ, and dD·fdLκ = c,
where dD·fdLκ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative. The following lemma character-
izes the divergence of the BR-dynamics vector field. As a matter of notation, if a
function f : X → X satisfies f(x) ∈ BRD(x) for all x ∈ X then we say f is a selection
of BRD.
Lemma 26. For every selection f of BRD, the vector field f satisfies D · f = −1.
The proof of this lemma follows from the fact that BRD is piecewise linear, and any
jumps in BRD are tangential to indifference surfaces.
Proof. Suppose f is a selection of BRD, and let f be written componentwise as
f = (fki ) i=1,...,N,
k=1,...,Ki−1
. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k ∈ {1, . . . ,Ki − 1}. Let Dj,`fki denote
the weak partial derivative of fki with respect to x
`
j , j = 1, . . . , N , ` = 1, . . . ,Kj − 1,
and let Dfki =
(
Dj,`f
k
i
)
j=1,...,N, `=1,...,Kj−1. Let Jf
k
i =
(
Jj,`f
k
i
)
j=1,...,N, `=1,...,Kj−1
denote the jump component associated with Dfki (see (31)).
The vector field f is piecewise linear. Breaking up f over regions in which it is
linear we see that dD·fdLκ = −1. It remains to show that D·f has no singular component;
i.e., under the decomposition (31), the measure D · f has zero Cantor component and
zero jump component.
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Since fki is piecewise linear and only jumps on the set
⋃Ki
`=1, ` 6=k Ii,k,` which has
finite κ−1 measure, fki has no Cantor part; that is, Cfki = (Cj,`fki )j=1,...,N, `=1,...,γj =
0 (see (31)). Hence, the singular component of D · f , which we denote here as S, has
no Cantor part and is given by S :=
∑N
i=1
∑Ki−1
k=1 Ji,kf
k
i .
Suppose that x ∈ Ii,k,` for some ` (recall ` 6= k). Suppose ν is a vector that is
normal to Ii,k,` at x. By the definition of Ii,k,`, if x ∈ Ii,k,` then for all xˆ ∈ X such
that xˆ−i = x−i we have xˆ ∈ Ii,k,`. This implies that the (i, k)-th component of ν
must be zero. Since Jfki = ((f
k
i )
+ − (fki )−)νHκ−1 for x on
⋃Ki
`=1, 6`=k Ii,k,` (see (32)),
taking the (i, k)-th component we get Ji,kf
k
i Hκ−1 = 0.
Since this is true for every pair (i, k) we see that S = 0, and hence D · f = −1
in the interior of X. An identical argument holds on the boundary of X, and hence,
S = 0 and D · f = −1.
The following lemma shows that for sets E ⊆ X∗ with relatively smooth boundary,
the surface integral of BRD over the boundary of E is well defined.
Lemma 27. Let E be a subset of X∗ with piecewise smooth boundary. For any
functions f, g that are selections of BRD we have∫
∂E
f · νEdHκ−1 =
∫
∂E
g · νEdHκ−1 =:
∫
∂E
BRD · νEdHκ−1,
where νE denotes the outer normal vector of E.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ X∗ is not on any indifference surface Ii,k,`. Then BRD(x)
maps to a singleton and f(x) = g(x).
Suppose x ∈ X∗ is on an indifference surface Ii,k,`. Let νI denote a normal vector
to Ii,k,`. Since x ∈ X∗, the vector field BRD can only jump tangentially to νI . Using
similar reasoning to the proof of Lemma 23, this implies that for any a, b ∈ BRD(x)
we have a · νI(x) = b · νI(x). Hence BRD(x) · ν := a · ν, a ∈ BRD(x) is well defined
for such x.
In particular, note that if x ∈ X∗ is on some indifference surface I and νI = νE
at x, then f(x) · νE = BRD(x) · νI for any function f that is a selection of BRD.
Let Î be the union of all indifference surfaces. Since ∂E is piecewise continuous
and the indifference surfaces are smooth, the set S := {x ∈ X∗ : x ∈ Î ∩∂E, νÎ(x) 6=
ν∂E(x)} has Hκ−1-measure zero, where νÎ(x) and ν∂E(x) denote the normal vectors
to Î and ∂E at x.
We have shown that f
∣∣
(∂E)\S = g
∣∣
(∂E)\S for any selections f, g of BRD, and
Hκ−1(S) = 0, and hence,∫
∂E
f · νEdHκ−1 =
∫
∂E
g · νEdHκ−1
for any selections f, g of BRD.
The following lemma shows that, within X∗, the BR-dynamics vector field com-
presses mass at a rate of −1. In particular, this implies that, within X∗, BR dynamics
cannot map a set of positive measure to a set of zero measure in finite time.22
22We note that this result can also be derived as a consequence of Lemma 3.1 in [8]. For the
sake of completeness and to simplify the presentation, we give a proof of the result here using the
notation and tools introduced in the paper.
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Lemma 28. Let E be a compact subset of X∗ with piecewise smooth boundary and
finite perimeter. Then
(33)
∫
∂E
BRD · νE dHκ−1 = −Lκ(E),
where νE denotes the outer normal vector of E.
Proof. We first note that by Lemma 26 for every selection f of BRD we have∫
E
dD · f = −Lκ(E).
Let (fn)n≥1, fn : X∗ → X∗ be a sequence of uniformly bounded C1 functions
such that fn → f a.e. for some function f : X∗ → X∗ satisfying f(x) ∈ BRD(x)
for all x ∈ X∗. (Such a sequence can be explicitly constructed by smoothing the
BR-dynamics vector field, e.g., [15].)
Let f and each fn be written componentwise as f = (f
s)κs=1 and fn = (f
s
n)
κ
s=1.
Let D · fn =
∑κ
s=1Dsf
s
n be the divergence measure associated with fn and D · f
=
∑κ
s=1Dsf
s the divergence measure associated with f . Since f and fn are BV
functions, by (30) we have
−
∫
X∗
fsn
∂φ
∂xs
dx =
∫
X∗
φDsf
s
n, and −
∫
X∗
fs
∂φ
∂xs
dx =
∫
X∗
φDsf
s
for n ∈ N, s = 1, . . . , κ, for any φ ∈ C1c (X∗).
For a function φ ∈ C1c (X∗), there exists a constant c > 0 such that |∂φ(x)∂xs | < c
for all x ∈ X∗. Since (fn)n≥1 is uniformly bounded, |fn(x)∂φ(x)∂xs | is bounded by some
constant c > 0 for all x ∈ X∗, and since X∗ is a bounded set, the constant function
cχX∗ (which dominates |fn ∂φ∂xs | on X∗) is integrable. Noting that fn
∂φ
∂xs
→ f ∂φ∂xs
pointwise, the dominated convergence theorem gives
lim
n→∞
∫
X∗
φDsf
s
n = − lim
n→∞
∫
X∗
fsn
∂φ
∂xs
dx = −
∫
X∗
fs
∂φ
∂xs
dx =
∫
X∗
φDsf
s.(34)
for n ∈ N, s = 1, . . . , κ. This implies that the sequence of measures (D · fn)n≥1 con-
verges weakly to D ·f in the sense that for any φ ∈ C1c (X∗) there holds lim
n→∞
∫
X∗ φdD ·
fn =
∫
X∗ φdD · f . Letting φ approximate the characteristic function χE , and noting
that by Lemma 26 we have (D ·f)(∂E) = 0, we see that limn→∞
∫
E
dD ·fn =
∫
E
dD ·f .
Hence,
−Lκ(E) =
∫
E
dD · f
= lim
n→∞
∫
E
dD · fn
= lim
n→∞
∫
∂E
fn · νEdHκ−1
=
∫
∂E
f · νEdHκ−1
=
∫
∂E
BRD · νEdHκ−1,
where the third line follows from the Gauss-Green theorem [13], the fourth line follows
from the dominated convergence theorem (by assumption, E has finite perimeter and
a piecewise smooth boundary, and f is bounded), and the fifth line follows from
Lemma 27.
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We now prove Proposition 21.
Proof. We begin by noting that, by Lemma 46 in the appendix, clQ, has Hausdorff
dimension at most κ− 2.
Let  > 0. By the definition of the Hausdorff measure ([13], Chapter 2), there
exists a countable collection of balls (Bj )j≥1, each with diameter less than , such
that clQ ∪ ∂Z ⊂ ⋃j≥1Bj and ∑∞j=1 c(diamBj2 )κ−2 < 2Hκ−2(clQ ∪ ∂Z), where
c := pi
κ−2
Γ(κ−22 )+1
, and where Γ in this context denotes the standard Γ function.
Since ∂Z is closed, clQ ∪ ∂Z is closed, and hence there exists a finite subcover
(Bj )
N
j=1 such that clQ ∪ ∂Z ⊂
⋃N
j=1B
j
 . Let B :=
⋃N
j=1B
j
 , and let
X∗ := X\ (B ∪ Z) .
Note that, by Lemma 45 in the appendix we have
(35) lim
→0
Hκ−1(∂B) = 0.
Fix some time T > 0, and for 0 < t ≤ T , let
E(T − t) := {x0 ∈ X∗ : x(0) = x0, x(t) is a BR process,
x(s) ∈ B, for some 0 < s ≤ t}
and note that the boundary ∂E(T − t) is piecewise smooth. The set E(T − t) may
be thought of as the set obtained by tracing paths backwards out of B from time T
back to time T − t. Let
V(t) := Lκ(E(T − t)).
Letting R denote the flux through ∂B into E(T − t) and again letting ν denote
the outer normal to ∂E(T − t), for t > 0 we have
d
dt
V(t) =
∫
∂E(T−t)\∂B
−BRD · ν dx(36)
≤ R +
∫
∂E(T−t)
−BRD · ν dx
≤ R + Lκ(E(T − t))
= R + V(t),
where the third line follows by Lemma 28.
Noting that ‖BRD‖∞ <∞, the flux through ∂B is bounded by
(37) R ≤ Hκ−1(∂B)‖BRD‖∞ =: R¯.
By (35) we have Hκ−1(∂B)→ 0 as → 0, and hence R¯ → 0 as → 0.
Using the integral form of Gronwall’s inequality, (36) and (37) give V(t) ≤ tR¯et,
0 < t ≤ T . In particular, this means that
(38) Lκ(E(0)) ≤ R¯eT ,
where the right hand side goes to zero as  → 0. Sending  → 0, we see that the set
W (T ) := {x0 ∈ X∗ : x(0) = x0, x(t) is a BR process, x(s) ∈ Q ∪ ∂Z for some 0 <
s ≤ T} has Lκ-measure zero.
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Since paths may only enter Z through the boundary ∂Z, this means that the set
of points in X from which Z can be reached within time T is contained in W (T )∪Z.
Furthermore, the set of points from which Q ∪ Z can be reached within time T is
contained in W (T ) ∪ Z ∪ Q, which is a Lκ-measure zero set. Since this is true for
every T > 0, we get the desired result.
5.2. Uniqueness of Solutions in Potential Games. Solutions of (1) are
known to always exist (see Section 2.2). However, being a differential inclusion, solu-
tions of (1) may not always be unique (see Section 2.3). In this Section we show that,
although not always unique, solutions of (1) are almost always unique in potential
games (i.e., we prove Proposition 3).
This issue can be readily addressed using the arguments above. Note the follow-
ing:
• The proof of Lemma 24 shows that solution curves with initial conditions in
X∗ are unique so long as they remain in X∗.
• The proof of Proposition 21 shows that the set Q ∪ Z (or equivalently, the
set X\X∗) can only be reached in finite time from a Lκ-measure zero subset
of initial conditions in X∗.
Since X∗ := X\(Q ∪ Z), this implies that for almost every initial condition in X∗,
solutions remain in X∗ for all t ≥ 0 and such solutions are unique for all t ≥ 0. Since
Lκ(X\X∗) = 0, we see that for almost every initial condition in X there exists a
unique solution of (1) and the solution is defined for all t ≥ 0. Recalling that we have
assumed throughout the section that the game Γ is regular, this proves Proposition
3.
Remark 29 (Viewing (1) as a differential equation). As usual, suppose a poten-
tial game is regular. The proof of Lemma 24 shows that if a solution curve x resides
in X∗ over some time interval [0, T ] then BR(x(t)) − x(t) is single-valued for a.e.
t ∈ [0, T ]. (The map BR(x) is single valued except for x on indifference surfaces. But
the proof of Lemma 24 shows that, while in X∗, any solution x crosses all indiffer-
ence surfaces instantly.) Furthermore, as discussed above, the proof of Proposition 21
implies that for a.e. initial condition in X∗ (and hence, a.e. initial condition in X)
solutions remain in X∗ for all t ≥ 0. Thus, for a.e. initial condition in X, the vector
field BR(x(t))−x(t) is single valued along the solution curve x(t) for a.e. t ≥ 0. This
justifies the remark in the introduction that, in potential games, it is relatively safe to
think of (1) as a differential equation (with discontinuous right-hand side).
5.3. Infinite-Time Convergence. The following proposition shows that it is
not possible to converge to Λ(x∗) in infinite time.
Proposition 30. Let Γ be a regular potential game and let x∗ be a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. Suppose (x(t))t≥0 is a BR process and x(t) → x∗. Then x(t) converges
to Λ(x∗) in finite time.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that for all t ≥ 0, x(t) is sufficiently
close to x∗ so that (12) and (13) hold. From the definitions of Λ(x∗) and P we see
that
(39) x(t)→ Λ(x∗) ⇐⇒ P(x(t))→ P(x∗).
If we integrate (13), use the fact P(x(t))→P(x∗), and set e(t) := d(P(x(t)),P(x∗)),
then we find that
(40) U˜(P(x∗))− U˜(P(x(t))) ≥ c2
∫ ∞
t
e(s)ds.
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Using (12) above we get
(41) ce2(t) ≥
∫ ∞
t
e(s) ds,
with c = c1/c2. Let η > 0 and suppose that for some time t we have e(t) ≤ η. Using
Markov’s inequality and applying (41) we can bound the time spent in a “shell” near
Λ(x∗) as
L1 ({s : η ≥ e(s) > η/2}) ≤ 2
η
∫ ∞
t
e(s) ds
≤ 2
η
ce2(t)
≤ 2cη.
Without loss of generality, assume that e(0) ≥ e(t) for t ≥ 0. Repeatedly applying
the above inequality we get
L1 ({s : e(s) > 0, s ≥ 0}) =
∑
k≥0
L1
({
s :
e(0)
2k
≥ e(s) > e(0)
2k+1
})
≤
∑
k≥0
2c
e(0)
2k
≤ 4ce(0).
Thus if P(x(t)) converges to P(x∗), it must reach it for the first time in finite time.
By construction P(x) = P(x∗) if and only if x ∈ Λ(x∗). Hence, if x(t) converges
to Λ(x∗) it must reach it for the first time in finite time.
By (13) we have ddt U˜(P(x(t))) ≥ 0 in a neighborhood of P(x∗). Since Γ is non-
degenerate, the Hessian of U˜ is invertible at P(x∗), and for all x˜ ∈ X˜ in a punctured
ball around P(x∗) we have U˜(x˜) 6= U˜(P(x∗)). Thus, if x(t) → x∗ and P(x(T )) =
P(x∗) (i.e., x(T ) ∈ Λ(x∗)) for some T ≥ 0, then we must have P(x(t)) = P(x∗) (i.e.,
x(t) ∈ Λ(x∗)) for all t ≥ T . Contrariwise, we would have U˜(P(x∗)) = U˜(P(x(T ))) <
lims→∞ U˜(P(x(s))) = U˜(P(x∗)), which is a contradiction.
6. Convergence Rate Bound. In this section we will prove Theorem 4 as
a simple consequence of Theorem 1. More precisely, we will prove the following
proposition which implies Theorem 4.
Proposition 31. Let Γ be a regular potential game. Then:
(i) For almost every initial condition x0 ∈ X, there exists a constant c = c(Γ, x0)
such that if x is a BR process associated with Γ and x(0) = x0, then
(42) d(x(t), NE) ≤ ce−t.
(ii) For every BR process x, there exists a constant c = c(Γ,x) such that (42) holds.
Part (i) of the proposition states that for almost every initial condition x0, the constant
c in (42) is uniquely determined by the game Γ and the initial condition x0. Part (ii)
of the proposition allows one to handle BR processes starting from initial conditions
where uniqueness of solutions may fail. In particular, part (ii) shows that if you allow
the constant to depend on the solution x rather than the initial condition then the rate
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of convergence is always (asymptotically) exponential. However, we emphasize that
part (ii) makes a somewhat weaker statement than part (i) since the constant c in part
(ii) can be made arbitrarily large in any potential game by allowing a solution x to
rest at a mixed equilibrium for an arbitrary length of time before moving elsewhere.23
Remark 32. In the above proposition, it is possible to make the constant c arbi-
trarily large by bringing the game Γ arbitrarily close to the set of irregular potential
games. For example, this was done in [5] in order to achieve arbitrarily slow conver-
gence in fictitious play in potential games. In future work we intend to address this
issue by studying uniform bounds on the constant c in (42) for all potential games Γ
with distance at least δ > 0 from the set of irregular games.
In order to prove Proposition 31, we will require the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 33. Let x∗ ∈ X be a pure-strategy equilibrium of a regular potential game.
Then for all x ∈ X in a neighborhood of x∗ there holds BR(x) = {x∗}; that is, the
pure-strategy equilibrium x∗ is the unique best response to every x in a neighborhood
of x∗.
This lemma follows readily from the observation that in regular potential games, all
pure NE are strict.24 We will now prove Proposition 31.
Proof. Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 imply that there exists a set Ω ⊂ X satisfying
the following properties: (a) Lκ(X\Ω) = 0, (b) for every BR process x with initial
condition x0 ∈ Ω, x is the unique BR process satisfying x(0) = x0, and x converges
to a pure-strategy NE.
Let x0 ∈ Ω, let x be a BR process with x(0) = x0, and let x∗ be the pure-strategy
NE to which x converges. Without loss of generality, assume that the pure-strategy
set Y is reordered so that
(43) x∗ = 0;
(i.e., T 1i (x
∗
i ) = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N , where T
k
i is defined as in Section 2).
By Lemma 33, for all x in a neighborhood of x∗ we have BR(x) = x∗. Since x(t)→
x∗, this, along with (1) and (43), implies that there exists a time τ = τ(Γ, x0) > 0
such that for all t ≥ τ , we have x˙(t) = −x(t). Hence, for t ≥ τ we have ‖x(t)‖ =
‖x(τ)‖eτ−t. Letting c := supt∈[0,τ ] ‖x(t)‖eτ we get ‖x(t)‖ ≤ ce−t for all t ≥ 0. This
proves part (i) of the proposition.
To prove part (ii) of the proposition, we only need consider initial conditions
x0 ∈ X\Ω. Suppose x(0) = x0 and x converges to a pure NE. Then using the same
reasoning as above, there exists a time τ = τ(Γ,x) > 0 such that x˙(t) = −x(t) for
all t ≥ τ . As before, letting c := supt∈[0,τ ] ‖x(t)‖eτ we get the desired result. On the
other hand, if x converges to a mixed equilibrium, then by Proposition 30 it does so
in finite time. This proves part (ii) of the proposition.
Remark 34. In Examples 7, 12, and 22 one observes that from almost every
initial condition, solution curves x of (1) eventually enter a region where the best
response settles on some pure strategy x∗; i.e., BR(x(t)) = x∗, for all t ≥ T for some
T ≥ 0. From here BR dynamics assume the form x˙(t) = x∗ − x(t), for all t ≥ T ,
which is linear, and hence converges at an exponential rate.
23Harris ([17], Conjecture 25) conjectured part (ii) of Proposition 31. Using Theorem 1 and
Proposition 3 we are able to resolve Harris’s conjecture and prove the slightly stronger result of part
(i) for almost every initial condition.
24Every regular equilibrium is quasi-strict [50], and a pure-strategy equilibrium is quasi-strict if
and only if it is strict. Hence, in regular potential games, all pure NE are strict.
32 B. SWENSON, R. MURRAY, AND S. KAR
Appendix.
Lemma 35. Suppose Γ is a regular game. At any mixed equilibrium there are at
least two players using mixed strategies.
Proof. Suppose that x∗ is an equilibrium in which only one player uses a mixed
strategy—say, player 1. Let Ci = carri(x
∗) and γi = |Ci|. Then the mixed strategy
Hessian is given by H˜(x∗) = (∂
2U(x∗)
∂xk1∂x
`
1
)k,`=1,...,γi = 0, (note the subscripts of 1) where
the equality to zero follows since U is linear in x1. But this implies that x
∗ is a
second-order degenerate equilibrium, which contradicts the regularity of Γ.
Lemma 36. Let x ∈ X and i = 1, . . . , N . Assume Yi is ordered so that y1i ∈
BRi(x−i). Then:
(i) For k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1 we have ∂U(x)∂xki ≤ 0.
(ii) For k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1, we have yk+1i ∈ BRi(x−i) if and only if ∂U(x)∂xki = 0. In
particular, combined with (i) this implies that yk+1i 6∈ BRi(x−i) ⇐⇒ ∂U(x)∂xki < 0.
Proof. (i) Differentiating (5) we find that
∂U(x)
∂xki
= U(yk+1i , x−i)− U(y1i , x−i).(44)
(i) Since y1i is a best response, we must have U(y
1
i , x−i) ≥ U(yk+1i , x−i) for any
k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1. Hence ∂U(x)∂xki ≤ 0.
(ii) Follows readily from (5).
Lemma 37. Let x ∈ X. If yki ∈ BRi(x−i) then ∂U(x)∂xki ≥ 0.
Proof. The result follows readily from (44).
Lemma 38. Suppose x∗ is an equilibrium and yki ∈ carr(x∗), k ≥ 2. Then
∂U(x∗)
∂xki
= 0.
Proof. Since U is multilinear, yki must be a pure-strategy best response to x
∗
−i.
The result then follows from Lemma 36.
Lemma 39. There exists a c > 0 such that |∂P˜ki (x)
∂x`j
| < c, i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k =
1, . . . , γi − 1, j = 1, . . . , N , ` ≥ γj for x in a neighborhood of x∗.
Proof. Differentiating (10) we see that
∂P˜ki (x)
∂x`j
= −∂gki (xp)
∂x`j
, i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k =
1, . . . , γi − 1, j = 1, . . . , N , ` ≥ γj , x = (xp, xm).
By the definition of g we have F (xp, g(xp), u) = 0 for all xp in a neighborhood of
x∗p. Hence,
0 = DxpF (xp, g(xp), u)(45)
= DxpF (xp, x
′
m, u)
∣∣
x′m=g(xp)
+DxmF (xp, xm, u)Dxpg(xp),(46)
By (7) and (8) we see that DxmF (xp, xm, u) = H(x). Since the equilibrium x
∗ is
assumed to be non-degenerate, H(x∗) is invertible and the above implies that
Dxpg(x
∗
p) = H(x
∗)−1DxpF (x
∗
p, x
∗
m).
ON BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN POTENTIAL GAMES 33
Using (8) and the multilinearity of U , one may readily verify that DxpF (x
∗
p, x
∗
m, u) is
entrywise finite. Since g is continuously differentiable, it follows that each entry of(
∂P˜ki (x)
∂x`j
)
i=1,...,N˜,k=1,...,γi−1
j=1,...,N, `≥γj
=
(
−∂g
k
i (xp)
∂x`j
)
i=1,...,N˜,k=1,...,γi−1
j=1,...,N, `≥γj
= −Dxpg(xp)
is uniformly bounded for x = (xp, xm) in a neighborhood of x
∗.
Lemma 40. Suppose V : Rn → R is twice differentiable. Suppose x∗ is a critical
point of V and the Hessian of V at x∗, denoted by H(x∗), is invertible. Then there
exists a constant c such that ‖∇V (x)‖ ≥ cd(x∗, x) for all x in a neighborhood of x∗.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Then for any  > 0 there exists a sequence
(xk)k≥1 ⊂ B(x∗, ) such that ‖∇V (xk)‖ < 1kd(xk, x∗). Let (xk)k≥1 be such a sequence
that furthermore satisfies limk→∞ d(xk, x∗) = 0. Let yk ∈ Rn, tk ∈ R be such that
xk = x
∗ + tkyk, ‖yk‖ = 1. Since (yk)k≥1 is a sequence on the unit sphere in Rn it
has a convergent subsequence; say, ykj → y as j → ∞. Let f : R → R be given by
f(t) := V (x∗ + ty).
Using the continuity of ∇V we see that for any c > 0 we have |f ′(t)| < ct for all
t sufficiently small. Since x∗ is a critical point of V we have f ′(0) = 0. Hence
f ′′(0) = lim
t→0
∣∣∣∣f ′(t)− f ′(0)t
∣∣∣∣ = limt→0 |f ′(t)|t < c.
Letting c → 0 we see that f ′′(0) = 0. But this means 0 = f ′′(0) = yTH(x∗)y,
implying the Hessian is singular, which is a contradiction.
The following lemma characterizes the level sets of polynomial functions. Before
presenting the lemma we require the following definition.
Definition 41. Given a polynomial p : Rn → R, n ≥ 1, let
Z(p) := {x ∈ Rn : p(x) = 0}
be the zero-level set of p.
Lemma 42. Let p(x) : Rn → R, n ≥ 1 be a polynomial that is not identically zero.
Then Ln(Z(p)) = 0.
Proof. We will prove the result using an inductive argument.
Suppose first that n = 1 so that p : R→ R. Let k denote the degree of p. Since p
is not identically zero, the fundamental theorem of algebra implies that p has at most
k zeros. Hence L1(Z(p)) = 0.
Now, suppose that n ≥ 2 and for any polynomial p˜ : Rn−1 → R there holds
Ln−1(Z(p˜)) = 0. We may write
p(x, xn) =
k∑
j=0
pj(x)x
j
n,
where k is the degree of p in the variable xn, x = (x1, . . . , xn−1), the functions pj ,
j = 0, . . . , k are polynomials in n − 1 variables, and where at least one pj is not
identically zero.
If (x, xn) is such that p(x, xn) = 0 then there are two possibilities: Either (i)
p0(x) = . . . = pk(x) = 0, or (ii) xn is the root of the one-variable polynomial px(t) :=∑k
j=1 pj(x)t
j .
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Let A and B be the subsets of Rn where (i) and (ii) hold respectively, so that
Z(p) = A ∪ B. For any xn ∈ R we have (x, xn) ∈ A ⇐⇒ x ∈ Z(pj), ∀j =
1, . . . , k. By the induction hypothesis, we have Ln−1(Z(pj)) = 0 for at least one j,
and hence
∫
Rn−1
χA(x, xn) dx = 0 for any xn ∈ R, where we include the argument
in the characteristic function χA, in order to emphasize the dependence on both x
and xn. This implies that xn 7→
∫
Rn−1
χ
(x,xn)∈A dx is a measurable function (it’s
identically zero) and
Ln(A) =
∫
R
∫
Rn−1
χA(x, xn) dx dxn = 0.
Now, by the fundamental theorem of algebra, for any x ∈ Rn−1 there are at most k
values t ∈ R such that (x, t) ∈ B, and hence ∫R χB(x, xn) dxn = 0. As before, this
implies that x 7→ ∫R χB(x, xn) dxn is a measurable function and
Ln(B) =
∫
Rn−1
∫
R
χB(x, xn) dxn dx = 0.
Since Z(p) = B ∪A, this proves the desired result.
Remark 43. Note that if p ≡ 0, then Z(p) = Rn. Thus, in general, if p : Rn → R
is a polynomial, then Lemma 42 implies that either Z(p) = Rn or Ln(Z(p)) = 0.
Lemma 44. Suppose Γ is a non-degenerate potential game. Then each indiffer-
ence surface Ii,k,`, as defined in (25), is a union of smooth surfaces with Hausdorff
dimension at most κ− 1.
Proof. Throughout the proof, when we refer to the dimension of a set we mean the
Hausdorff dimension. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, k, ` ∈ {1, . . . ,Ki}, k 6= ` and let I := Ii,k,`,
where Ii,k,` is as defined in (25). Note that I is the zero-level set of the polynomial
p(x) := U(yki , x−i) − U(y`i , x−i). By Lemma 42 and Remark 43 we see that either
Lκ(I) = 0, or I = X. Being the level set of a polynomial, if Lκ(I) = 0, then I is the
union of smooth surfaces with dimension at most κ− 1.
Suppose that I has dimension greater than κ−1. Then by the above, we see that
I = X. Since Γ is a finite normal-form game, there exists at least one equilibrium
x∗ ∈ X. Letting x∗ be written componentwise as x∗ = ([x∗]mj )j=1,...,N, m=1,...,Ki−1
we see that if [x∗]ki > 0, then x
∗ ∈ I = X implies that x∗ is a second-order degenerate
equilibrium. Otherwise, if [x∗]ki = 0, then x
∗ ∈ I = X implies that x∗ is a first-order
degenerate equilibrium. In either case we see that x∗ is a degenerate equilibrium, and
hence Γ is a degenerate game, which is a contradiction.
Since I was an arbitrary indifference surface, we see that if Γ is a non-degenerate
game, then every indifference surface has dimension at most κ− 1.
Lemma 45. Let B be as defined in the proof of Proposition 21. Then,
Hκ−1(∂B)→ 0 as → 0.
Proof. Following standard notation (see [13], Chapter 2), for 0 ≤ s <∞, 0 < δ ≤
∞, and A ⊂ Rκ, let
Hsδ(A) := inf
{ ∞∑
j=1
α(s)
(
diamCj
2
)s
: A ⊂
∞⋃
j=1
Cj , diamCj ≤ δ
}
,
where α(s) := pi
s
Γ( s2 )+1
, and where Γ in this context denotes the Γ function
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By our construction of (Bj )j≥1, for every  > 0 we have
∞∑
j=1
α(s)
(
diamBj
2
)κ−2
< 2Hκ−2(Q ∪ ∂Z) <∞.
Since diamBj ≤  for every  > 0, j ∈ N, this gives
lim
→0
Hκ−1 (∂B) ≤ lim
→0
Hκ−1 (B)
≤ lim
→0
∞∑
j=1
α(s)
(
diamBj
2
)κ−1
≤ lim
→0

∞∑
j=1
α(s)
(
diamBj
2
)κ−2
≤ lim
→0
2Hκ−2(Q ∪ ∂Z) = 0.
By the definition of the Hausdorff measure we have Hκ−1(∂B) := supδ>0Hκ−1δ (∂B).
Hence, the above implies lim→0Hκ−1(∂B) = 0.
Lemma 46. Let Q be defined as in Section 5.1. Then clQ has Hausdorff dimen-
sion at most κ− 2.
Proof. Let A be the subset of X where two or more decision surfaces intersect.
Let N ⊂ A be the subset of X where two or more decision surfaces intersect and their
normal vectors coincide. Define the relative interior of N with respect to A as
riN := {x ∈ N : ∃ > 0 s.t. B(x, ) ∩A ⊂ N},
and define the relative boundary of N with respect to A as
∂N := clN\riN.
Since each indifference surface has Hausdorff dimension κ − 1, N has Hausdorff di-
mension at most κ − 1. In particular, N is the union of a finite number of smooth
κ− 1 dimensional surfaces and a component with Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2.
This implies that the relative boundary of N has Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2.
Let Q˜ be as defined in Section 5.1. Note that the closure of Q˜ satisfies cl Q˜ ⊆
Q˜ ∪ ∂N . Since the sets Q˜ and ∂N have Hausdorff dimension at most κ − 2, the set
cl Q˜ also has Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2.
Let Λ(x∗) be as defined in Section 5. If Λ(x∗) = {x∗}, then Λ(x∗) is closed and
has Hausdorff dimension 0. Otherwise, Λ(x∗) is defined as the graph of g. In Section
4.1 it was shown that Graph(g) has Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2. Since g is a
smooth function, the closure of Graph(g) has Hausdorff dimension at most κ− 2.
Recall that Q is defined as Q = Q˜∪Λ(x∗) and hence clQ = cl Q˜∪ cl Λ(x∗). Since
cl Q˜ and cl Λ(x∗) each have Hausdorff dimension at most κ−2, clQ also has Hausdorff
dimension at most κ− 2.
Lemma 47. Let Z be as defined (27). Then for any x ∈ Z there holds ν · y = 0
for any vector ν normal to Z at x, and any y ∈ BRD(x)
Proof. Suppose x ∈ X and x is in some indifference surface Ii,k,`. Suppose ν is
a vector that is normal to Ii,k,` at x. By the definition of Ii,k,`, if x ∈ Ii,k,` then
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for all xˆ ∈ X such that xˆ−i = x−i we have xˆ ∈ Ii,k,`. This implies that the (i, k˜)-th
component of ν must be zero for every k˜ = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1.
For x ∈ X, let N (x) := {(i, k) : i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, k ∈ {1, . . . ,Ki − 1}, x ∈
Ii,k,` for some ` = 1, . . . ,Ki− 1, ` 6= k} so that, given a point x ∈ X, N (x) specifies
the indifference surfaces in which x lies. Letting BRDki be the (i, k)-th component
map of BRD, note that by the definition of an indifference surface, BRDki (x) is single
valued for every pair (i, k) /∈ N (x).
Suppose x ∈ X\Q is in at least one decision surface I and let ν be a vector that is
normal to I at x. Note that x /∈ Q implies that if x is contained in any other decision
surface Iˆ 6= I, then ν is also normal to Iˆ at x. Letting ν be written componentwise as
ν = (νki )i=1,...N, k=1,...,Ki−1, the above discussion implies that ν
k
i = 0 for every pair
(i, k) ∈ N (x).
Now suppose x ∈ Z. By the definition of Z we have x /∈ Q and x is in at least
one decision surface I. Let ν be a vector that is normal to I at x. By the definition
of Z, there exists some y ∈ BRD(x) such that y · ν = 0. Breaking this down in terms
of components in N (x) we have
0 = y · ν =
∑
(i,k)∈N (x)
yki ν
k
i +
∑
(i,k)/∈N (x)
yki ν
k
i .
The first sum is zero since νki = 0 for all (i, k) ∈ N (x). Consequently, the second
sum must also be zero. But we have shown above that F ki (x) is single valued for any
(i, k) /∈ N (x). Hence, for any y˜ ∈ BRD(x) we have y˜ki = yki for all (i, k) /∈ N (x), and
in particular,
∑
(i,k)/∈N (x) y˜
k
i ν
k
i =
∑
(i,k)/∈N (x) y
k
i ν
k
i = 0. Moreover, since ν
k
i = 0 for
all (i, k) ∈ N (x) we have ∑(i,k)∈N (x) y˜ki νki = 0, which implies
y˜ · ν =
∑
(i,k)∈N (x)
y˜ki ν
k
i +
∑
(i,k)/∈N (x)
y˜ki ν
k
i = 0.
Since y˜ ∈ BRD(x) was arbitrary, this proves the desired result.
7. Conclusions. The best-response dynamics (1) underlie many learning pro-
cesses in game theory. We have shown that in any regular potential game (and
hence, in almost every potential game [49]), for almost every initial condition, the
best-response dynamics (1) are well posed (i.e., there exists a unique solution) and
converge to a pure-strategy NE. As a simple application of this result, we showed that
solutions of (1) almost always converge at an exponential rate in potential games.
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